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When the government acquires property for public use, the relo-
cation of dispossessed residents normally presents no problem. Isolated
acquisitions do not flood the housing market with home seekers, and a
condemnation award will usually enable an owner to purchase a new
dwelling. Because of its magnitude, however, the urban renewal pro-
gram has been unable to avoid two problems: finding sufficient new
housing, and enabling relocatees to establish themselves in that hous-
ing. The Public Works Committee of the House of Representatives
has estimated that in the near future 66,000 families 1 will be displaced
annually as a result of urban renewal.' This illustrates the increasing
involvement of state and federal governments in public works projects,
t A.B. 1961, Cornell University. LL.B. 1967, New York University Law School.
Member, New York Bar.
1 The word "family" will be used throughout this paper to include single persons,
unless otherwise indicated.
2 STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON PuBLic WORKS, STUDY OF COMPENSATION AND As-
SISTANCE FOR PERSONS AFFECTED BY REAL PROPERTY ACQUISITION IN FEDERAL AND
FEDERALLY ASsIsTED PROGRAMS, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 272 (Comm. Print 1964) [here-
inafter cited as HOUSE STUDY OF COMPENSATION], reprinted in ADVISORY COMMISSION
ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, RELOCATION: UNEQUAL TREATMENT OF PEOPLE
AND BUSINESSES DISPLAcED BY GOVERNMENTS 129 (1965) [hereinafter cited as AD-
VISORY COMMISSION REPORT]. The House Committee gave the following list of federal
agencies responsible for dislocation, in order of impact: Urban Renewal Administra-
tion (now Renewal Assistance Administration); Bureau of Public Roads; Public
Housing Administration;- Defense -Department; General Services Administration;
Post 'Office-Department; Interior Department; Tennessee" Valle"y Authority; Inter-
national Boundary and Water- Commission; and the Agriculture Department.
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especially urban revival, for in 1964 only 34,000 persons were thus
affected.3
The problems mentioned are particularly acute in urban renewal
projects because these programs only operate in "blighted areas" 4 of
largely substandard housing, where most of the residents are without
the financial (and often the social) means with which to reestablish
themselves elsewhere. Eighty-eight per cent of the substandard hous-
ing in the country in 1958 was occupied by families earning less than
$6,000 a year; " in 1963, twenty-nine per cent of the families in urban
renewal projects had incomes of less than $2,400 a year.' Because
relocatees are generally poor they need low-cost housing to move into,
as well as funds with which to pay the costs of moving. In, addition,
two-thirds of current relocatees are nonwhite, 7 with the result that
available housing, already limited to the low-cost market, is restricted
still further.' Finally, a 1964 study of relocation by the Census Bureau
suggested that two-thirds of all relocatees, and almost three-fourths of
nonwhite relocatees, were tenants rather than homeowners prior to re-
location.' As tenants, neither the common law nor the Constitution
guarantees them any benefits from condemnation (as they do guarantee
a homeowner) with which to defray the costs of moving to new neigh-
borhoods, except release from the obligation to pay rent for the con-
demned premises. °
Urban renewal legislation has attempted to solve these two prob-
lems, and in the past several years Congress has also adopted the urban
3 HoUsE SrTUY OF COMPENSATION 272. As of 1964, an average of 74,000 families
per year were forced to move due to all government land acquisitions; the estimated
number in the near future is 111,000. Id.
442 U.S.C. § 1460(a) (1964).
5A. ScHORR, SLUMS AND SOCIAL INSECURITY 98 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
ScHoR].
6 Testimony of William L. Slayton, Commissioner, Urban Renewal Administra-
tion, Hearings on Urban Renewal Before the Subconn. on. Housing, House Comm.
on Banking and Ciurrency, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 414 (1963) [hereinafter cited as 1963
Urban Renewal Hearings]. Some relocatees had incomes so low, or families so large,
that even had public housing been available it would not have been open to them,
since a public housing project must be able to operate on a solvent basis. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1410 (Supp. II, 1966).
7 This reflects a downward trend. In 1957, 76% of urban renewal relocatees were
nonwhite, compared with 66% in 1961. HOUSING AND HOME FINANCE AGENCY, RE-
LOCATION FROM URBAN RENEWAL PROJECT AREAS THROUGH DECEMBER 1961, at 8
(1962) [hereinafter cited as HHFA DATA ON RELOCATION]. The percentage in 1963
was 63%. ADVISORY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 25 (by computation; based
on unpublished data of the Urban Renewal Administration).
s See, e.g., ADVIsoRY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 34-35.
9 HOUSING AND HOME FINANCE AcENCY, THE HOUSING OF RELOCATED FAMILIES:
A SUMMARY OF A BUREAU OF THE CENSUS SIURVEY OF FAMILIES RECENTLY DISPLACED
FROM URBAN RENEWAL SITS 10 (1965) [hereinafter cited as CENSUS BUREAU STUDY].
10 Usually a lease provides that the owner's rights and obligations are terminated
when the property is sold, including disposition through eminent domain proceedings.
Cf. Comment Eminent Domain Valuations in an Age of Redevelopment: Incidental
Losses, 67 YALE L.J. 61 (1957).
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renewal pattern and authorized similar relocation assistance for other
new government land acquisition programs." Yet relocation has been
called the "Achilles heel" of urban renewal,'2 and critics have charged
the renewal program with everything from exporting slums to being a
device for "Negro removal." " Nevertheless, the renewal statute con-
tains provisions that apparently guarantee an improvement in the situa-
tion of those relocated. Why these provisions have failed presents an in-
teresting study in the roles of an administrative agency and the courts
in implementing a statutorily imposed condition on federal grants to
independent local agencies.
I. THE RELOCATION STATUTE AND ITS EFFECTS
A. Rehousing Requirements
The basic urban renewal statute was enacted as Title I of the Hous-
ing Act of 1949.' Provisions of the urban renewal title anticipated
the problem of supplying a sufficient number of replacement housing
units for those cleared under its slum clearance section. Two solutions
were adopted. One was to rely on the "trickling down" to the urban
poor of middle-income housing left behind by families moving into the
new buildings on the renewal sites or into FHA-sponsored housing in
the suburbs. The Senate report on the 1949 Act finds it
perfectly apparent that the elimination of residential slums
in central city areas and their redevelopment in accord with
a plan for the most appropriate use of the land therein . . .
makes necessary a dispersion of the families now living in
such slums. Federal loan assistance for the acquisition and
preparation of open unplatted urban or suburban land to be
developed for predominantly housing use, so that adequate
provision can be made for the necessary dispersion of some
portion of the central city population is therefore essential to
11 The Public Housing Act contains relocation provisions identical to the urban
renewal statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1415 (7) (b) (iii) (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 1415(8) (Supp. II,
1966), and the Housing and Urban Redevelopment Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3071-74
(Supp. II, 1966), applied the urban renewal provisions to the following programs
authorized by statutes: Urban Mass Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1601-11 (Supp.
II, 1966); Public Facilities Construction Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1491-97 (1964); Open
Space and Urban Beautification and Improvement Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1500-1500e
(Supp. 1967) ; and the Community Facilities Construction Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3101-08
(Supp. 1967). A different type of relocation provision was adopted for the Tennessee
Valley Authority, 16 U.S.C. § 831(c) (1) (1964) ; the Interior Department, 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1231-34 (1964) ; the Defense Department, 10 U.S.C. § 26$ (1964) ; and NASA, 42
U.S.C. §2473(b) (14) (1964).
12 Millspaugh, Problems and Opportunities of Relocation, 26 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 6 (1961).
13 D. THuRsz, WHERE ARE THEY Now? 5 (1966).
'4 Ch. 338, tit. I, 63 Stat. 413 (1949).
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any effective slum clearance operation, and is entirely appro-
priate.' 5
The other remedy was a statutory guarantee that every relocatee
would be able to find a home; section 105(c) of the Act" provided
that the contract governing the loans and grants made to local public
agencies (LPAs) carrying out renewal programs in their communities
require that
[t]here be a feasible method for the temporary relocation of
families displaced from the project area, and that there are,
or are being provided, in the project area or in other areas not
generally less desirable in regard to public utilities and public
and commercial facilities and at rents or prices within the
financial means of the families displaced from the project
area, decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings equal in number to
the number of and available to such displaced families and
reasonably accessible to their places of employment . . . .
The Senate report underlined the intent to guarantee that no one would
be without a decent place to live as a result of the slum clearance
program:
The Bill sets up adequate safeguards against any undue hard-
ship resulting from the undertaking of slum clearance under
current conditions. It requires, first, that no slum-clearance
project shall be undertaken by a local public agency unless
there is a feasible means for the temporary relocation of the
families to be displaced, and unless adequate permanent hous-
ing is available or is being made available to them.'
8
This guarantee of rehousing has been amended only twice; each
change has increased the LPAs' responsibility for carrying out effec-
tive relocation programs. Since 1964 Congress has required an LPA
to provide a "relocation assistance program" that will determine the
relocation needs for the city's urban renewal areas, and provide infor-
mation and assistance to relocatees to "minimize the hardships of dis-
placement." "9 The only specific requirements are that the LPA main-
tain a listing of real estate brokers able to help relocatees find new
housing, and that it consider public housing near the renewal site when
identifying relocation housing resources. The second change, in 1965,
15 S. REP. No. 84, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1949). See also the" dissent of Senator
Lehm'an, S. REP. No. 1472, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 151 (1954).
16Ch. 338, § 105(c), 63 Stat. 416, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § i455(c) (Supp. II,
1966).--
17 Id.
Is S. Rm. No. 84, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1949). -
1942 U.S.C. § 1455(c) (Supp. II, 1966) ..
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was more specific and potentially of greater importance to the relocatee.
Now,
a condition to further assistance [is that] the [Secretary]
shall require, within a reasonable time prior to actual displace-
ment, satisfactory assurance by the local public agency that
decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings as required by the first
sentence of this subsection [§ 105 (c) (1)] are available for the
relocation of each such individual or family.
2 0
B. Planning For Relocation
The guarantee of suitable rehousing was strengthened in 1954 by
requiring LPAs to plan in advance to satisfy relocation needs. At that
time the emphasis in the legislation shifted from slum clearance to that
program of citywide slum prevention known as urban renewal.2 Since
then a city desiring to undertake urban renewal (or one of several other
federally funded city revival programs) has been required to present a
"Workable Program for Community Improvement" as part of its ap-
plication.22 While the statute merely requires in general terms that
there be a program for "ultilizing appropriate private and public re-
sources to eliminate, and prevent the development or spread of, slums," 23
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) spe-
cifically requires as one part of the program 4 that the city have a plan
projected two years into the future-' for relocating into standard
housing2 " individuals and families displaced by any government project
2042 U.S.C. § 1455(c) (2) (Supp. II, 1966). The Act of May 25, 1967, Pub. L.
No. 90-19, §6(b), 81 Stat. 21, substituted "Secretary" for "Administrator" here and
elsewhere in the Act.21 See ADVISORY COMMIssION REPORT, supra note 2, at 17.
2242 U.S.C. § 1451 (c) (Supp. II, 1966). Receipt of funds for public housing,
FHA mortgage insurance for urban renewal site housing and rehabilitation, and
below-market interest-rate mortgage insurance for displacees from government con-
struction projects was also conditioned on having a Workable Program. Id.; see
HOUSING AND HoMnE FINANCE AGENCY, PROGRAM FOR COMMUNITY IMPROVEMENT 6
(1960) [hereinafter cited as WORKABLE PROGRAM].
2342 U.S.C. § 1451(c) (Supp II, 1966).
24 The other 6 elements are: (1) an adequate health and safety code, and adequate
building and occupancy ordinances; (2) a comprehensive community plan for improve-
ment and blight prevention; (3) a neighborhood analysis of the community's blight
problems; (4) administrative organization capable of prosecuting a fight on blight;
(5) adequate financing by the municipality; and (6) citizen participation in the fight
on slums. WORKABLE PROGRAM, supra note 22, at 4.
' WORKABLE PROGRAM, supra note 22, at 36.26LPA Letter No. 321, at 4 (January 13, 1965), defines "standard housing" as
being a
dwelling in sound and weathertight condition, including kitchen with sink and
stove, hot and cold running water, a complete private bath, electricity for
lighting, and installed heat where required by climatic 6onditions. It is served
by necessary public and--community facilities; is in an area generally not less
desirable than the urban renewal area with respect to public utilities and'public
and commercial facilities, is not subject to serious hazards or nuisances, ...
and- otherwise'conforms to the standards for relocation housing established
for urban renewal projects.
Under the guidance of Technical Guide No. 91 see-text accompanying note. 89 infra,
the local public agency establishes such other standards. -
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in any part of the community.
2 7
The initial certification requirements are minimal 28 since they are
aimed only at developing proper planning practices. The city need
only designate an individual or office with responsibility for relocation,
and commence a survey of community relocation needs for the follow-
ing two-year period. 9 Each year the program must be recertified, for
which the city must show completion of the survey, plans for correcting
substandard areas of the program, and execution of these remedial
plans."0 If the program is not recertified, future proposed projects are
rejected, although it appears that projects for which contracts have
already been signed are not affected."'
C. Meeting the Costs of Relocation
The 1949 Housing Act reflected a failure by Congress to recog-
nize and deal with the second relocation problem, that of enabling the
relocatee to establish himself in his new home. Part of the problem is
simply meeting the cost of moving. Poor tenants, forced to move to a
new neighborhood, are particularly in need of financial aid to cover
moving costs, wages lost because of time taken from work in order to
hunt for and move to a new apartment, and other hidden costs of relo-
cation." While regulations implementing the 1949 Housing Act did
authorize LPAs to give tenants their moving expenses and the first
month's rent in the new quarters, aid was available only if the sum
would be less than the cost to the LPA resulting from both eviction
proceedings and the consequent project delay. Only by refusing to
move could a family receive monetary assistance for moving. The
restrictions clearly indicate that the purpose of the payments was to
expedite redevelopment rather than to aid relocatees."3
Since 1956, Congress has authorized similar payments without
these restrictions. At present the only conditions for receipt of relo-
2 7 For example, even though the federal highway program does not require relo-
cation assistance by the states or municipalities affected, a city so affected may none-
theless have an obligation to anticipate relocation needs if it is simultaneously using
one of the Department of Housing and Urban Development's programs requiring
Workable Program certification.
2 See Johnstone, The Federal Urban Renewal Program, 25 U. Cm. L. REv. 301,
321 n.113 (1958).
2 9 WoaRABL PROGRAM, supra note 22, at 36.3 0 WORKABLE PROGRAM, supra note 22, at 37. The showing may be made by ap-
plications for public housing, etc. Id.
-1 Rhyne, The Workable Program-A Challenge for Community Improvement,
25 LAW & CONTENT. PROB. 685, 693 (1960).
3 2 See Testimony of Lester Eisner, Jr., Regional Administrator, Housing and
Home Finance Agency, Hearings on Real Property Acquisition Practices and Ade-
quacy of Compensation in Federal and Federally Assisted Programs Before a Select
Subcomm. on Real Property Acquisitions of the House Public Works Comm., 88th
Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1964).
3See AvisoRy COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 17.
34 42 U.S.C. § 1465 (1964), as amended (Supp. II, 1966).
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cation payments are residence within the renewal area at the time of
execution by the LPA and the Renewal Assistance Administration
(RAA) " of HUD of a financial assistance contract contemplating
acquisition of the particular building. 6 Rehabilitation of a building
also entitles tenants to receive relocation payments if the subsequent
increase in rent is both greater than ten per cent and above the
standards of ability to pay as determined by the LPA.7 Since 1956,
therefore, payments have been available as soon as the renewal contract
is signed, even though the site resident moves before receiving a notice
to quit. Families are authorized to receive payments up to $200 for
"reasonable and necessary" moving expenses, plus compensation for
"actual direct loss of property." as Alternatively, the LPA may estab-
lish a schedule of fixed payments for relocatees, based on the number of
rooms in the site residence, subject to the $200 maximum per family.
An additional "relocation adjustment payment" was authorized by
Congress in 1964.40 The adjustment is not authorized if the relocatee
moves into public or substandard housing, since it is designed to assist
the relocatee in obtaining standard relocation housing and to compensate
for the increased rent he usually must pay.4" Nor may the relocatee
receive the adjustment if he turns down public housing offered him.42
Since the RAA requires that all site occupants apply for public housing
as a condition to receipt of the adjustment payments,' the relocatee
loses the adjustment if public housing is offered, whether he accepts
the housing or not. The adjustment is calculated so that the relocatee
The Renewal Assistance Administration (RAA) is the successor within the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to the old Urban Renewal
Administration section of the Housing and Home Finance Agency (HHFA). HUD
assumed the duties of the HHFA under the Department of Housing and Urban
Development Act of 1965, § 5(a), 5 U.S.C. § 624c(a) (Supp. I, 1966).
For simplicity, actions of the Urban Renewal Administration prior to the change
of name will be referred to as those of the kAA, and similarly, actions of HHFA as
those of HUD.
3624 C.F.R. § 3.103(b) (1968). Evidently it is not necessary that the building
actually be acquired if the renewal plan approved by the RAA calls for its acquisition.
3724 C.F.R. § 3.103(c) (3) (1968).
3842 U.S.C. § 1465(c) (1964), as amended (Supp. I, 1966).
39The schedule in New York City, for example, ranges from $45.00 for 1 room
through $95.00 for 4 rooms, to a maximum of $176.00 for 10 rooms.
4042 U.S.C. § 1465(c) (2) (Supp. II, 1966).
41Testimony of Robert C. Weaver, then Administrator, HHFA, Hearings on
Urban Renewal Before the Subcominm. on Housing of the House Comm. on Banking
and Currency, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1964) [hereinafter cited as 1964 Urban Re-
newal Hearings]. The CENsus BURAU STmDy, mpra note 9, at 1, reported that the
median rent increased from $66 per month paid prior to relocation to $74 per month
afterward. The ratio of rent to income went from 25%' to 287 (compared with a
United States average of 14.67o, see 1965 DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELoP-
ME-T, ANNUAL REPORT 1965, at 321, Table 370 (1966), which figure includes all
housing services including utilities, rent, etc.).
4 2 See 42 U.S.C. § 1465(c) (2) (Supp. II, 1966); LPA Letter No. 321, at 12
(January 13, 1965).
43 See LPA Letter No. 321, at 11 (January 13, 1965).
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pays no more than twenty per cent of his income for rent,44 but the
RAA has emphasized that the payments are not a license to LPAs to
rehouse site residents where the rent would exceed ability-to-pay stand-
ards that the LPA must establish when it applies for renewal funds.
4
5
There are two limitations upon the amount of adjustment pay-
ments available to the relocatee. While a family may receive up to
$500, an individual may receive adjustment payments only if he is
more than sixty-two years old.46 Second, the monthly payments are
made only during the first year after relocation. The rationale behind
this latter limitation is not clear. When the RAA originally requested
authority to make the payments, it suggested a maximum two-year
duration for each family, deeming further assistance unnecessary for
several reasons. It was anticipated that there would be a sizable in-
crease of standard low- and middle-income housing in the community
by the end of that period, probabiy as a result of construction on the
renewal site. Relocatees were expected to increase their income by the
end of the two-year period,47 and it was felt that after two years of
subsidization a family would be able to adjust to the higher housing
expenditure.48
Several other benefits available to relocatees can in some cases
further reduce the cost of moving to standard housing. Amendments
in 1965 authorized the payment of some incidental expenses of home-
owners, such as penalty payments for early cancellation of a mortgage,
costs of conveying the property to the LPA, and any portion of real
estate taxes the owner has already paid but that applied to periods
after condemnation. 49 Relocatees have preferential status for admis-
sion to section 221 (d) (3) below-market interest-rate housing,50 hous-
ing aided under the rent supplement program," and public housing (to
the extent that the local housing authority is directed to promulgate
rules that give consideration to its responsibility to rehouse displaced
44 Compare the 14.6% average national rent-to-income ratio, sipra note 41.
45 LPA Letter No. 321, at 15 (January 13, 1965). As to the LPA standards for
ability to pay, see text accompanying notes 91-92 infra.
4642 U.S.C. § 1465 (c) (2) (Supp. II, 1966). This is the only relocation provision
that does not apply equally to all relocatees.
47 HUD claims to have shown that this will be the natural result of the removal
of the tensions of living in rundown buildings. The results of a demonstration project
in Washington, D.C., announced in January, 1966, showed a 24% income increase
among 50 large families, all needing 4 or more bedrooms. Houses were rented for the
families, and educational and social services were provided. The demonstration pro-
gram cost $194,470. N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1966, at 64, col. 1.
48 1964 Urban Renewal Hearings, supra note 41, at 42.
4942 U.S.C. § 1465(d) (Supp. II, 1966).
50 12 U.S.C. § 17151(d) (3) (Supp. II, 1966).
5' 12 U.S.C. § 1701(s) (Supp. II, 1966). See also the program for putting public
housing units in private accommodations, for which relocatees are eligible. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1421(b) (Supp. II, 1966).
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families).52 A 1964 amendment authorizes subsidization of local public
housing authorities accepting low income relocatees who normally
would be excluded because they could not pay the rent necessary for the
authority to satisfy the Public Housing Act's requirement that public
housing operate on a solvent basis.53 Section 221 of the Housing Act '4
authorizes relocatees, whether originally owners or tenants, to obtain
government insurance on a new home if they buy one, and also provides
a guarantee of low down payment provisions. And the Economic
Opportunity Act permits the use of Community Action Program
funds to provide assistance to relocatees displaced by public or private
construction.r5
D. Decent, Safe and Sanitary Dwellings: The Myth of Relocation
Success
The RAA reports that relocation is successful over eighty per cent
of the time,"0 as measured by whether the relocatee moves into a "stand-
ard" dwelling satisfying the requirements of section 105 (c), including
ability of the relocatee to pay. Excluding relocatees whom the LPAs
have been unable to trace to their new dwellings, the percentage of suc-
cessful relocation reaches ninety-three per cent.57 The Census Bureau
has independently confirmed these statistics after conducting a survey
of 2300 families relocated in the summer of 1964.' s
Many persons have nevertheless doubted the accuracy of these
glowing reports. As of 1965, 202,500 families had been relocated, yet
only 84,000 housing units had been constructed on renewal sites." Of
these, only 7,900 were low-rent public housing units, and only another
8,600 were low- or moderate-income units constructed under the section
221(d) (3) program." Moreover, barely one-third of the reusers
were nonwhite,' although minority groups constituted more than two-
5242 U.S.C. § 1410(g) (1964) ; 24 C.F.R. § 1520.4 (1968).
5342 U.S.C. § 1410 (1964), as amended (Supp. II, 1966).
5412 U.S.C. § 17151 (1964), as amended (Supp. II, 1966).
5542 U.S.C. §2785 (Supp. 11, 1966).
S56URBAN RENEWAL ADMINISTRATION, SELECTED DATA ON RELOCATION OF FAmI-
LIES AND INDIVIDUALS 1 (1966).
5 7DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, ANNUAL REPORT 1965, at 18
(1966).
5
8CENSUS BUREAU STUDY, supra note 9, at 1.
9 DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, ANNUAL REPORT 1965, at 18
(1966).
60 Id. See also Grigsby, Housing and Slum Clearance: Elusive Goals, 352 ANNALS
107, 110 (1964) ; Johnstone, supra note 28, at 321 n.113. The ADVISORY COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 2, at 30, commented: "Commonly, housing built in the renewed
area is for middle and upper income families, beyond the financial means of most of
the displaced." However, the Urban Renewal Commissioner testified that as of 1963,
20,000 low-cost units had been built, or were being built, on renewal land. He did not,
however, define "low-cost." 1963 Urban Renewal Hearings, supra note 6, at 428.
61 DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, ANNUAL REPORT 1965, at 18
(1966).
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thirds of the prerenewal occupants. Not unexpectedly, a 1964 survey
of urban renewal problems faced by mayors of cities with populations
over 100,000 elicited the observation that "[b]y far the problem most
frequently mentioned was lack of an adequate supply of standard
housing, particularly for large, low-income, and nonwhite families." ,
The adjustment payment and the preference given relocatees for
rent-supplement housing indicate an implicit recognition by the RAA
that there is a shortage of low-cost housing units for relocatees. Yet
when Congress in 1966 finally enacted a requirement that all projects
intended primarily for residential reuse had to include "a substantial
number of" low- and moderate-cost housing units,' the RAA inter-
preted "substantial" to mean twenty per cent.' To convince HUD
of its concern, Congress used the 1968 Housing Act to remove much
of HUD's discretion by changing "substantial number" to "majority." '5
Thus, the site is not always used, and only two other sources for
low income housing remain: "trickle-down" and new private construc-
tion. The draftsmen of the Housing Act contemplated that middle-
income housing would "trickle down" and become low-income housing
available for rehousing relocatees. 6  But criticism by early skeptics "
of the workability of this "trickle down" theory has been borne out.",
Early favorable expectations evidently have been defeated by a com-
bination of increased migration to the city by low-income families,
impediments such as de facto segregation to the free play of the housing
market, normal population expansion within the city, and the reduc-
tion in the city's housing supply due to urban renewal clearance, as
shown by the gap between the number of families displaced and the
number of on-site units built.69 The attempt of the cities to lure middle
income families in from the suburbs, as well as site reuse for non-
residential purposes such as shopping and civic centers, has also made
"trickle-down" unworkable. Moreover, the "trickle down" theory has
6 2 ADvisoRY CommIssIoN REPORT, supra note 2, at 27. The survey was conducted
jointly by the Advisory Commission and the United States Conference of Mayors.
Id. at 3.
63 Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, § 703, 42
U.S.C. § 1455(f) (Supp. II, 1966).64 See 113 CONG. REC. 10,405 (daily ed. July 26, 1967) (remarks of Senator
Tower).
65 Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 512, 82
Stat. 524 (1968), amending 42 U.S.C. § 1455(f) (Supp. II, 1966).
66 See text accompanying notes 14-15 supra.
67E.g., dissent of Senator Lehman, S. REP. No. 1472, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 151
(1954) ; Fisher & Winnick, A Reformulation of the "Filtering" Concept, 7 J. SOCIAL
IssuEs 47-48 (1951) ; Johnstone, supra note 28, at 350.
68 J. BELLUSH & M. HAUSNECHT, URBAN RENmwAL: PEOPLE, POLITICS, AND
PLANNING 366, 372-73 (1967) ; DsP'T OF HousiNG AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, URBAN
HOUSING MARKET ANALYSIS 88 (1966) [hereinafter cited as HoUSING MARKET
ANALYSIS].
69 See HOUSING MARKET ANALYSIS 88; ScH1oR, supra note 5, at 108-10.
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been steadily undermined by Congress since 1956, through the author-
ization of greater percentages of renewal funds to be available for
nonresidential projects. Prior to 1956 a project had to be primarily
residential; in that year, ten per cent of renewal funds were exempted
from this requirement." In 1959 the exempted percentage was in-
creased to twenty per cent,71 in 1961 to thirty per cent,72 and in 1965
to thirty-five per cent.7"
The second source for new low-cost housing is private construc-
tion. However, the failure of the construction industry to develop
adequate techniques to keep down the cost of new housing is clear. 74
The number of both state and federal statutory devices to help builders
produce low-rent housing is continually increasing, but without any
apparent solution to the low-income housing problem.75
Despite the obvious shortage of housing necessary for relocation,
the RAA insists that its relocation program is successful. One of the
reasons it can do so is that the statistics used as the foundation of its
argument do not reflect the true number of persons for whose disloca-
tion the urban renewal program is responsible. An unknown number
of site residents move when they first hear of the project, before the
first acquisition by the LPA and the commencement of the LPA's
obligation to the RAA to maintain relocation records.7 ' These per-
sons are not counted as relocatees, and neither the RAA nor the LPA
need concern itself with the condition of their new housing.7 7 One LPA
report showed that approximately twenty-five per cent of the site resi-
dents on one project had moved in this preacquisition periods.7  The
70 Act of Aug. 7, 1956, ch. 1029, § 302(b) (1), 70 Stat. 1097.
71 Housing Act of 1959, § 413, 73 Stat. 675.
72 Housing Act of 1961, § 308, 42 U.S.C. § 1460(c) (1964).
73 Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, §308, 42 U.S.C. § 1460(c)
(Supp. II, 1966).
74 Johnstone, supra note 28, at 351-52.
75 See, e.g., the comparison of the Percy and Kennedy plans for solving the low-
income housing shortage in Semple, The Slum Planners, NEW REPUBLIC, July 22, 1967,
at 9. For example, the highly publicized "instant renewal" experiment in New York
City, where buildings were gutted and rehabilitated within 48 hours, has recently been
found to be too expensive for widespread application. N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1968,
at 51, col. 1.
7
6 See LPA Letter No. 373 (May 13, 1966).
771d. at 2-3, stating that if these early movers are paid relocation payments the
amount must be reported to the RAA even though the relocatees are not listed on the
workload of persons for whom the LPA must find adequate relocation housing.
78 MINNEAPOLIS HOUSING AND REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, REPORT ON THE RE-
LOCATION OF RESIDENTS AND BUSINESS INSTITUTIONS FROM GATEWAY CENTER RE-
NEWAL AREA 8 (1963). Millspaugh, supra note 12, at 20, as long ago as 1961 pin-
pointed as the "big problem" of urban renewal the fact that a large number of re-
locatees left the site before the first acquisition, and therefore before they were eligible
for relocation assistance. Secretary Weaver testified in 1964, however, that those who
do move out prior to acquisition are eligible for relocation. 1964 Urban Renewal
Hearings, supra note 41, at 219. This assumes they can be found, and that the LPA
is willing to do so.
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Government Accounting Office (GAO) has reported instances where
more than fifty per cent of original site residents were not included
in relocation figures or provided with relocation assistance.7  Those
who leave in panic face the same problems in the housing market as do
relocatees who wait until acquisition to move. Not having the benefit
of the relocation assistance program, they are less likely than assisted
relocatees to find "standard" housing, although their plight is due to
the same urban renewal project.
A more fundamental reason for the misleading nature of the
RAA's success figures is that they are based on data submitted by the
LPAs and only spot checked, if checked at all, by the RAA. The LPA
must submit high percentages of relocation success to satisfy its con-
tractual promise to the RAA that there is adequate relocation housing in
the LPA's community. GAO investigations of renewal projects sug-
gest that the LPA reporting system is far from reliable. In St. Louis,
twenty-three of twenty-four randomly selected families from one
project, all of whom were reported by the LPA to be relocated in
standard housing, were found living in substandard housing. In an-
other project in the same city, the relocation housing of twenty-five of
thirty-five families checked had been similarly misreported."0 In Kansas
City only ten families from one project were originally reported to have
been moved into substandard units; after a GAO spotcheck, the LPA
estimated that the number should be revised upward by 500 per cent."1
Moreover, the LPA admitted that "some" inspections of relocation
housing were merely "visual inspections through automobile wind-
shields." 82 RAA officials have engaged in similar practices when spot-
checking the LPA reports.8s As a result of such practices, St. Louis in
1959 was estimated to need 63,000 units of low-income housing beyond
that planned or under construction in order to adequately rehouse re-
locatees from projects then being planned or completed.84 Nevertheless,
the RAA continued to approve LPA findings that relocation was feasi-
ble in the city. A 1964 report concerning the District of Columbia,
79 COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS OF THE
UNITED STATES: INADEQUATE RELOCATION ASSISTANCE TO FAMILIES DISPLACED FROM
CERTAIN URBAN RENENvAL PROJECTS IN KANSAS AND MISSOURI ADMINISTERED BY
FORT WORTH REGIONAL OFFIcE, HOUSING AND HOME FINANCE AGENCY 10 (Report
No. B-118754, 1964) [hereinafter cited as GAO FORT WORTH RELOCATION REPORT].
80 COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS OF
THE UNITED STATES: REVIEW OF SELECTED PHASES OF WORKABLE PROGRAMS FOR
COMMUNITY IMPROVEMENT UNDER THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE FORT WORTH RE-
GIONAL OFFICE, HOUSING AND HOME FINANCE AGENCY 68 (Report No. B-118754,
1962) [hereinafter cited as GAO FORT WORTH WORKABLE PROGRAM REPORT].
Buld. at 64.
82 Id. See also GAO FORT WORTH RELOCATION REPORT, spra note 79, at 7.
8 GAO FORT WORTH RELOCATION REPORT, supra note 79, at S.
84GAO FORT WORTH WORKABLE PROGRAM REPORT, supra note 80, at 66-67.
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made well after a general improvement of relocation practices in 1961,'
indicated that four of twenty randomly selected families-twenty per
cent-were living in substandard units despite LPA and RAA reports
to the contrary. 8
II. ADMINISTRATION OF RELOCATION
A. Establishing Standards
Since the Housing Act contemplates local initiative in developing
and controlling a renewal program, even though the program is financed
largely through federal funds, LPAs are given broad powers to define
the application of section 105(c) in their relocation efforts.8 7 Some
standards are set by the RAA, however, below which the LPAs may
not fall. Generally, the standards are those adopted in the local housing
and occupancy codes if the codes have been approved by the RAA as
part of the city's Workable Program, and those used by the local public
housing authority to describe housing so unsafe and unsanitary that the
occupants are entitled to public housing accommodations.88
The RAA has developed and published a few guidelines to the
meaning of the section 105(c) limitations in its Technical Bulletin
No. 9.s9 "Decent, safe, and sanitary" has been interpreted to require
"standard" housing, as that term is defined for purposes of the Work-
able Program." The "ability to pay" criterion may be satisfied in several
ways, depending on whether a relocation proposal is being reviewed or
relocation is actually taking place. For purposes of the proposal, the
LPA may adopt a rent-to-income ratio of twenty to twenty-five per
cent for rental housing, and a maximum sales-price-to-income ratio of
250 per cent.' During actual relocation, however, the LPA is per-
mitted to ignore these limits in favor of dealing with individual cases
according to such variables as family size."2 The LPA has even greater
discretion in dealing with the location requirements of the statute--that
the new housing be in as desirable a location with regard to public and
85 See Hartman, The Housing of Relocated Families, 30 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS
266, 279 (1964).
86 COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS OF THE
UNITED STATES: INADEQUATE POLICIES AND PRACTICES RELATING TO THE RELOCATION
OF FAMILIES FROM UP-AN RENEWAL AREAS, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA REDEVELOPMENT
LAND AGENCY AND HOUSING AND HOME FINANCE AGENCY 11 (Report No. B-118638,
1964) [hereinafter cited as GAO WASHINGTON, D.C. REPORT].
87 URBAN RENEWAL ADMINISTRATION, TECHNICAL GUIDE No. 9, DETERMINING
LOCAL RELOCATION STANDARDS 2 (1961) [hereinafter cited as TECH. GUIDE No. 9].
S8 This code is approved by HUD as part of its Public Housing Program. Id.
at 3.89 Id. at 3-6.
90 See note 26 supra.
9 1 T cH. GUIDE No. 9, at 5-6.
92 ld. at 5.
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commercial facilities as was the old, and reasonably accessible to the
jobs of site residents. Although the RAA claims it will-look at the
LPA's statement of relocation policies to evaluate whether the reloca-
tion will "assure equal or better amenities . . .and will involve no
unreasonable or excessive financial burden on project families," I the
proposal need not contain any standards attempting to define these
limits for planning purposes.
B. Enforcing the Standards
Before funds will be made available for the renewal project, the
renewal statute requires that the city council pass a resolution approving
the LPA's renewal plan as a whole. 4  But the application for funds
must also contain sufficient information to substantiate the finding of
relocation feasibility. Thus, to obtain the initial survey and planning
grant (used to prepare a tentative renewal plan and to undertake the
surveys necessary to develop it) the LPA must submit details on the
city's housing supply, including availability by race, "standardness" by
tenure, turnover rates for these categories, the city vacancy rate and
number of housing starts by rental or sales price, and the estimated
number of site residents to be displaced. 5  If the project will result
in a substantial reduction of housing open to nonwhites "in the project
area," the application must give the extent of such reduction, the sub-
stitute housing previously unavailable to the affected group that will be
open to them, and plans for LPA conferences with responsible local
leaders of minority groups.96
The tentative renewal plan prepared with the survey and planning
grant will include the proposed standards for measuring the accept-
ability of relocation housing. The RAA requires that the LPA make
a site occupancy survey to establish the needs of the site residents for
that portion of the community's housing that complies with the stand-
ards. The percentage of residents who must be contacted is not fixed,
but it must be great enough to enable accurate prediction of the income
brackets, race, bedroom need, and eligibility for public housing of all the
site residents.9 7
The number of standard vacancies that will exist in the com-
munity during the relocation period is the final piece of information the
RAA requires in order to determine whether the LPA can relocate resi-
93 Id. at 6.
!442 U.S.C. § 1455(a) (1964).
95 URBAN RENEWAL ADMINISTRATION, HOUSING AND HOME: FINANCE AGENCY,
URBAN RENEWAL MANUAL § 16-1 [hereinafter cited as URBAN RENEWAL MANUAL].
96Id. § 10-4-1(11).
97 Id. § 16-2-2, at 3.
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dents in accordance with its standards. In smaller cities it is relatively
easy to collect this information. In larger communities the RAA re-
quires a survey of vacancies, or other substantive data supporting the
LPA's conclusion that sufficient relocation housing is available. 98 The
LPA must also indicate its attitude toward relocation by submitting
information concerning its assistance program, eviction policy, method
for inspecting proposed relocation housing, the hours and location of
the on-site relocation office, the method of making relocation pay-
ments, the means to be used to inform site residents of the impending
move, and other details.'0
The regional office of the RAA is then responsible for evaluating
the data submitted. Because of the differing quality of the support-
ing evidence and of the resources available for checking it, the accuracy
of this evaluation will vary considerably from project to project. The
methodology of the required surveys is one uniformly available check
on the proposal. Depending on the existence of Commerce Depart-
ment housing construction reports for the city, FHA housing surveys,
the city's Workable Program submissions, and the statements and
statistics the LPA has submitted with requests for aid for other urban
programs such as public housing, market analysts may be able to check
in further detail the accuracy of its estimate of future housing supply.10
An "intergroup relations specialist" also reviews the plan to ensure that
minority group leaders have been consulted during planning' 0 ' and
that there is satisfactory assurance of standard housing open to minority
groups after site clearance.102  On-site inspection is used to further
check the LPA's estimate.'0 As a result of the recent addition of
section 105 (c) (2) to the statute, the LPA will have to submit, before
actual relocation begins, an updating of the information it used to sup-
port its feasibility finding, which the RAA may then compare with
the estimates made several years before. It is not yet clear how the
law will operate, or what corrective action the RAA will require should
9 8 Interview with Mel Geffner, Relocation Staff, Office of Community Develop-
ment, Department of Housing and Urban Development, in Washington, D.C., Aug. 9,
1967 [hereinafter cited as Geffner Interview]. See also HousING MAXEr ANALYsis,
supra note 68, at 29-34.
9 9 URBAN RENEIWAL MANUAL, supra note 95, § 16-2-1.
100 Geffner Interview, snpra note 98; Interview with Herman Hillman, Regional
Director, Housing Assistance Administration, Department of Housing and Urban
Development, in New York City, Mar. 27, 1967 [hereinafter cited as Hillman Inter-
view].
101 Representative minority group leaders are defined as "persons accepted as such
by the minority community itself, such as persons holding office in civic or other re-
sponsible organizations of minority citizens." URBAN RENEWAL MANUAL, supra note
95, § 10-1, at 2.
'
0 2 See id. § 10-1, at 1; cf. 42 U.S.C. § 1455(c) (Supp. II, 1966).
103 Interview with Joseph Lopes, Public Information Officer, Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development, Region I, in New York City, Mar. 21, 1967 [hereinafter
cited as Region I HUD Interview].
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it appear that adequate relocation is jeopardized, since the require-
ment applies only to projects approved after the passage of section
105 (c) (2) in August 1965. If enforced, it could provide a basis for
better control of relocation, since the statements submitted to the RAA
will concern conditions in the immediate future, and the LPAs will be
unable to hide behind the argument that the statements submitted to
satisfy statutory requirements are only long range predictions, made
several years in advance of actual relocation and therefore subject to
honest errors of great magnitude.
C. Enforcement Problems
When the interests of all groups concerned with urban redevelop-
ment are in conflict, the LPA cannot satisfy them all. The interests of
relocatees are not always compatible with those of the business and civic
leaders of the community. The leaders are interested in the increased
tax base that results from a renewal project,' in revitalization of the
downtown business district to offset competition from suburban shop-
ping centers,"0 5 and in luring the middle class back into the cities.'
These goals are achieved by using the renewal land for just about any
purpose except low income housing; the more such housing is included
in the renewal plan, the less land there is with which to satisfy the
major objectives of these groups.
The LPA's continued existence depends on the satisfactory com-
pletion of the renewal plan. It therefore must forge an alliance of
political interests in the community sufficient to withstand challenges
either at the public hearing '0 7 or when the city council considers the
required resolution of support. Rarely, if ever, are the poor who
live in those slums designated for clearance (or their allies) able to
command the resources necessary to carry out the sponsorship of a
renewal project. The resources required are within the control of
people concerned with beautification and tax revenues, with the in-
evitable result that LPAs find it exceedingly difficult to take the side
of relocatees in a conflict over the reuse of the land. The small per-
centage of low- and middle-income units built on renewal sites 108
304 Cf. the 1966 Washington, D.C. LPA annual report, which, typically, promi-
nently noted that the City's Southwest Urban Renewal Project would generate 8
times the previous taxes when fully developed. New York City's LPA reported in
1965 that New York's renewal projects generated more than twice the previous taxa-
tion. The Urban Renewal Commissioner reported to Congress an average tax base
increase of 427% in 403 projects on which work had commenced by 1963. 1963
Urban Renewal Hearings, supra note 6, at 426-27.
105 See, e.g., Johnstone, supra note 28, at 313; Millspaugh, stpra note 12, at 31.
1o Johnstone, suepra note 28, at 313; Millspaugh, supra note 12, at 31.
1
0 7 See notes 118-20 infra and accompanying text.
108 See text accompanying notes 59-62 supra.
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demonstrates the relocatees' lack of power. A successful balance be-
tween powerful community interests, achieved by the LPA and re-
flected in its plan for the site, will not eagerly be undone simply because
others in the community complain at the required public hearing held
to present the more or less completed plan.' °
Since the LPA must be so involved in community politics, the
RAA should be particularly sensitive to infringements of the relocatees'
interests. Yet, as has been shown, the RAA has put itself in the
position of depending on the LPA not only to develop the specific
standards implementing section 105(c)'s protection for relocatees, but
also to provide the information necessary to determine in advance if
those standards can be met. To compound the problem, the RAA also
depends on the LPA for the information necessary to evaluate LPA
compliance with the standards in carrying out relocation.
This wholesale turnover of part of the renewal program to an
agency compelled to adopt a biased view of the problem perhaps reflects
the RAA's response to pressures on itself. The LPA, not disgruntled
relocatees, is the RAA's recurring "client"; without the LPA's willing-
ness to undertake second and third renewal projects, the RAA would
not exist."0 But by identifying so strongly with one point of view,
the RAA, in its supervision of relocation, has become yet another regu-
latory agency now controlled by the very interests it was designed to
regulate. The RAA could tighten up its administration of relocation in
several ways. In short, one analysis of the validity of LPA reports on
relocation might apply equally well to the RAA's efforts to ensure
proper relocation:
[O]ne must question whether local authorities are free to
judge and report on the results of their relocation operations
in an objective and impartial manner. In effect, the local
agency may have no choice but to issue extremely positive re-
109 Many of the same considerations apply to the issue of the neutrality of the
LPA in drawing up an urban renewal plan. See Note, Scope of Judicial Review in
Urban Renewal Legislation, 17 VAND. L. REV. 1235, 1239 (1964) ; Comment, Judicial
Review of Urban Redevelopment Agency Determination, 69 YALE L.J. 321, 328 (1959).
Moreover, the cost of preparing the plan is high, further inhibiting openness to change.
Id.
110 Because action can be taken only through a local public authority, it must
be underwritten in terms of political and fiscal responsibility by the city gov-
ernment. While the federal agency has a veto power on the city's program,
the city in turn may refuse to co-operate with the agency. Thus, many of the
politically unpalatable aspects of the working program are honored in the
breach ....
Greer & Minar, The Political Side of Urban Development and Redevelopment. 352
ANNx.s 62, 66-67 (1964). The Urban Renewal Agency Commissioner from 1959 to
1961 testified, in defense of a project attacked by the GAO as not conforming to the
statutory criteria, that urban renewal was a local program, and that it was felt the
particular project was necessary to strike a spark in that community regardless of the
satisfaction of the criteria. 1963 Urban Renewal Hearings, mpra note 6, at 354-55.
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location reports: anything less than this might produce legal,
political, and technical conflicts and could slow up or curtail
the entire rebuilding effort, which is the principal goal of the
authority and its program."
D. Minimally Required Administrative Improvements
Although for planning purposes the establishment of guidelines
to define suitable sites for relocation housing may not be effective,
certain limits could be set which would bind the LPA during the actual
relocation. For example, the relocation of people who live within one
transportation fare of their job to a multiple-fare area could be
prohibited, as could the transfer of persons from an area with paved
roads to areas without them. The result of the RAA's failure to set
such binding limitations has been that the relocatees, whose interests
the RAA is supposed to protect, have had to fight the RAA as well
as the LPA. For example, the RAA recently approved the initial
proposal of a town that planned to relocate site residents living in a
section of town with all the amenities into an area with dirt roads, and
was considering final approval of the project until a formal complaint,
with its implied threat of a lawsuit, was filed with the RAA by attorneys
for the residents." 2 It should not be necessary to take legal action to
force an administrative agency to comply with its basic statutory
obligations in as clear a case as this.
The RAA could also improve relocation practices by requiring
that, as soon as the contract is approved, LPAs distribute to each
relocatee printed information describing methods of obtaining reloca-
tion payments, the assistance provided by the LPA's relocation staff,
and the standards that their new dwelling must meet before relocation
may be considered complete. Under the present system, relocatees
are unaware of the LPA's contractual promise, and it is too easy for
an LPA to ignore the guidelines during actual relocation.
The major area of weakness, however, is the RAA's evaluation
of the LPA's estimates of available housing. Much more could be
done to insure receipt of adequate information on the city's housing
situation. The RAA claims that its market analysts cooperate with
those administering the Workable Program carried out by the applicant
city, as well as with other government branches having statistical data
on the community's housing."' This was not always true, and may not
be now; a 1962 GAO report cited instances where
I'l Hartman, supra note 85, at 280.
112 See text accompanying notes 123-33 infra.
113 See text accompanying note 100 supra.
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ineffective Workable Programs of communities were appar-
ently not considered in executing contracts for slum clearance
and urban renewal projects. Conversely, we noted that
Workable Programs of communities were repeatedly recerti-
fied without apparent regard to the difficulties being en-
countered by the communities in fulfilling the urban renewal
objectives of the act.1 4
The RAA agreed with the criticism; 115 nevertheless, another GAO
report two years later revealed that urban renewal contracts had been
authorized in Cincinnati despite the RAA's refusal to recertify that
city's Workable Program." Since the RAA is so dependent on the
statistics furnished by the LPA, it might consider requiring com-
munities with bad relocation records to produce more detailed surveys
of the housing market in support of subsequent renewal requests, even
though the cost to the LPA might be high. In any event, certain
minimal requirements for the quality of statistical data evidencing com-
pliance with statutory requirements should be established for the sub-
mission of all renewal requests. If there are no FHA reports on the
housing market, for example, the same information should be com-
piled from other sources before an agreement is reached to extend
aid. Alternatively, a condition could be placed on the grant requiring
the grantee to rejustify its estimates at a time nearer the date of actual
relocation.
Enforcement would be improved if the RAA were to set up pro-
cedures for gathering information from relocatees concerning their
experiences with LPA relocation. In 1959, the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit observed that the Urban Renewal Commissioner
had received and considered objections of site residents to the sup-
posed feasibility of relocation from the Lincoln Center redevelopment
project, and suggested that the Commissioner was obligated to do so.",
But beyond the statutory requirement of holding a public hearing, the
RAA still has not established a procedure for eliciting or determining
community response when evaluating relocation proposals of the
LPA.118  While the minutes of the public hearing must be submitted
to the RAA along with the final project proposal, the LPA need show
114 GAO FORT WORTH WORKABLE PROGRAM REPORT, supra note 80, at 41.
115 Id.
1 16 ComPTRoLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS OF
THE UNITED STATES: WEAKNESSES IN ADmINISTRATION OF REQUIREMENT FOR THE
WORKABLE PROGRAM FOR COMMUNITY IMPROVEMENT FOR THE CITY OF CINCINNATI,
OHIO 8 (Report No. B-118754, 1964).
"7T Gart v. Cole, 263 F.2d 244 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 978 (1959). For
a discussion of this case, see notes 152-57 infra and accompanying text.
118 Community complaints "will be considered if offered," however. Region I
HUD Interview, mupra note 103.
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only that relocation was discussed," 9 and has no obligation to report
either the specific objections raised by neighborhood residents or the
responses of the LPA.1' Emphasizing the highly political nature of
decisions supposedly controlled by the statute, the RAA has said that the
normal route for bringing residents' objections to its attention is
through a Senator or Congressman.' 21 This is an unsatisfactory situa-
tion, since success of any political appeal will depend more on the ability
of the site residents to interest a politician in their cause, as well as on
the power of the politician involved, than on the merits of the case-in
contrast to a more formalized procedure for objection and rebuttal by
the LPA.
Finally, the RAA should consider more stringent supervision of
those LPAs that do not comply with section 105 (c). The statute
prohibits the RAA from initially funding projects lacking adequate
relocation provisions. The RAA is entirely too reluctant to interfere
thereafter if the promises are not met. In 1964, Secretary Weaver
opposed legislation introduced in Congress that would have required
the RAA to withhold funds as soon as it appeared that a city was not
fulfilling the program commitments. He testified that such a measure,
which would have given the RAA a means of resisting pressures from
the LPA and its allies, would result in "program delays." '2
III. REMEDIES FOR INADEQUATE RELOCATION HOUSING
A. Administrative
Although the RAA has not established a formal complaint pro-
cedure for appeals by site residents, it has, on occasion, refused to
permit a project to continue after site residents have complained. One
successful complaint on behalf of site residents was filed by attorneys
in 1966 concerning a project in Pulaski, Tennessee." In addition to
raising constitutional objections to the relocation plan,"s the complaint
challenged the designation of the site as a blighted area,' and the
existence of relocation housing; 12 it also alleged failure of the LPA to
119 URBAN RENEWAL MANUAL, supra note 95, § 4-3, at 3.
2 Hillman Interview, supra note 100. Compare this with the proposed public
hearing requirements of the Federal Highway Administration, §§ 3.11(c), 3.15 (b) (3),
33 Fed. Reg. 15,663 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Highway Hearing Require-
ments], which would require the state highway department to submit a transcript of the
hearing and a summary of the views presented with a request for approval of a highway
route.
121 Region I HUD Interview, supra note 103.
1221964 Urban Renewal Hearings, supra note 41, at 220.
123 Complaint for Plaintiffs, Allen v. Pulaski Housing Authority (H.U.D., filed
Dec. 15, 1966) [hereinafter cited as Pulaski Complaint].1 2 4 Id. §§ 12, 13.
125 Id. § 6.
1
2 6 Id. §8.
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consult with community leaders of the minority group being displaced
during the project planning. 7 All these allegations state violations
of RAA regulations. The complaint included the affidavits of a city
planner hired by the residents' attorneys to inspect and evaluate the
renewal site as well as the housing and vacant lots offered to relocatees.
The affidavits were supported by films taken at these locations.
In rejecting the city's submission of the final stage of the renewal
plan, the RAA cited a change in marketability prospects during the four
years since the first approval of the application for planning funds and
the inability of the LPA to provide adequate relocation facilities.'
The LPA had proposed either building on vacant lots or relying on
speculative new housing plus normal housing turnover s for the
relocation of those site residents who were ineligible for the public
housing then under construction. Rejecting the city's reliance on
speculative construction and normal turnover, the RAA noted the
absence of a "firm commitment to provide those units at a time, place,
and price that meet our requirements." 130 In addition, the avail-
ability of vacant lots deemed by the RAA to meet "statutory standards
for relocation housing [was] seriously limited, with the result that the
Regional Office [found] the relocation plan presented by the Housing
Authority to be unsatisfactory." 132
More significant was the success achieved with a complaint to
HUD over the proposed redevelopment of a part of Newark, N. J.,
primarily with a State Medical College. The complaint filed by the
National Office for the Rights of the Indigent alleged specific errors
in the Newark LPA's computation of available relocation housing-
including the failure of the LPA to subtract from the city's vacancy
rate the number of substandard, segregated, and overpriced dwellings;
a serious difference between the LPA's estimate of the number of
dwellings demolished since the 1960 census and the demolition permits
issued by the city during that period; and the failure to recompute
the city's population increase since the last census although the LPA
had computed the city's increase in dwelling units.3 Resulting
127Id. § 9.
128 Letter from Robert C. Weaver, Secretary, Dep't of Housing and Urban De-
velopment, to Jack Greenberg, Director of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educa-
tional Fund, Inc., Mar. 22, 1967, at 1 [hereinafter cited as Weaver Letter]; cf. Pro-
posed Highway Hearing Regulations, §§3.5(e), 3.5(f), requiring a new hearing if
final administrative approval is not sought within 3 years of the public hearing.
19 Weaver Letter 1.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 2. The complaint had also charged that the public housing units were
needed for persons already without adequate housing and were therefore unavailable
for relocation, but the RAA did not respond to this allegation. Pulaski Complaint,
supra note 123, § 8A.
132 Complaint for Plaintiffs at 1-2, Epperson v. Housing Authority of the City of
Newark (H.U.D., filed Dec. 17, 1967). See generally 12 WnvL RE L. BuLT 10 (1968).
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negotiations with the State, HEW, HUD, and the LPA led to the
approval of the project several months later, but the college agreed to
take a much smaller portion of the site than had been planned, and the
state agreed to finance a rent supplement program to the extent necessary
to adequately relocate those living in the redevelopment area. The par-
ties also agreed to establish five committees empowered to intervene in
the redevelopment at any stage to insure that the site residents would be
properly relocated, and that they, as well as the rest of the community,
would enjoy better housing, increased employment (including on-site
construction job opportunities), and better health services as a result of
the project. Representatives of the community are a majority of the
members of each committee.'
The RAA does not always consider such complaints. Just prior
to the filing of the Newark complaint, the RAA approved the Philadel-
phia LPA's final plans for a project even though attorneys for a home-
owners' association had previously filed a complaint alleging violations
of RAA regulations similar to those in Pulaski. The group requested
an opportunity to submit proof of its charges, but while their petition
for a hearing on the merits was pending, the RAA signed the contract
with the LPA.134
Even if available, administrative hearings would be of limited
utility in larger cities. In a community like Pulaski, with a 1960 popu-
lation of 6,616, the adequacy of relocation facilities can easily be deter-
mined prior to relocation. In a large city, however, it is very difficult
to demonstrate this adequacy several years in advance of actual reloca-
tion. The RAA publication describing how an LPA housing analyst
should compute relocation resources emphasizes that estimating the
number of relocation resources available in three to five years may
produce only "fairly accurate" 135 results, and is "not easily or precisely
accomplished." In many cases, therefore, there must be a large
measure of guesswork concerning facilities until actual relocation begins.
Although the RAA has sometimes intervened due to complaints in
the planning stage, it apparently has not as yet stepped in when resi-
dents have filed complaints at the action stage of the project. Accord-
ing to the complaint in a suit now pending in San Francisco, for exam-
33 Agreements Reached Between Community and Government Negotiators Re-
garding New Jersey College of Medicine and Dentistry and Related Matters, March
14, 1968, on file at National Office for the Rights of the Indigent, New York City.
13 4 Powelton Civic Home Owners Ass'n v. HUD, 284 F. Supp. 809, 831 (E.D.
Pa. 1968). See also Complaint for Plaintiffs at 3-5. Compare the Proposed Highway
Hearing Regulations, §3.17(b), where no final decision may be made pending the
outcome of an administrative appeal.
135 HOUSING MARxEr ANAv SIS, mpra note 68, at 29, 35.
136 Id. at 87. See text accompanying notes 250-53 infra for a discussion of the
potential impact of the 1968 Housing Act's Neighborhood Development Programs on
this inability to accurately predict housing data 3 to 5 years in advance.
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ple, a residents' group filed a protest with the RAA regarding inadequate
relocation resources for the Western Addition project. The RAA at
that time was considering reviving the project, which had been cur-
tailed as part of the HUD suspension of all programs in California
during the brief life of Proposition 14. No decision had been made at
the time the residents filed their protest and offered to submit docu-
mentation of inadequacy. According to the residents' complaint, the
RAA nevertheless recommenced the project without listening to their
objections. 137  And in Norwalk, Connecticut, residents' protests after
relocation had begun were similarly ignored by the RAA.1' 8 It is no
doubt true, as the RAA and the LPAs contend, that any delay in the
project after relocation has begun creates major problems, among
which are increased costs, 139 nonsatisfaction of the LPA's obligations
to redevelopers, 140 and deterioration of the neighborhood.' 41 Never-
theless, resolution of difficulties that do not surface until relocation has
begun remains a major problem in renewal administration.
B. Judicial Remedies
1. Against the Renewal Assistance Administration
a. Standing to Sue in Federal Courts
It is not yet clear whether the courts will assist a residents' group
attempting to get the RAA to enforce the LPA's contractual promise
to the RAA that "there are or are being provided... dwellings equal in
number to the number of . . . displaced individuals . . .. , 142 Most
cases ... have held that relocatees cannot ask the courts to compel the
RAA to enforce the promise or to cease supporting the project, pri-
marily because the relocatees have been found to lack standing to sue.
But "the concept of standing is a practical and functional one designed
to insure that only those with a genuine and legitimate interest can par-
ticipate in a proceeding . . . ." ' Accordingly, the use of that concept
should involve a determination of those factors that comprise such a
genuine and legitimate interest in the subject matter of a case. Why
137 Complaint for Plaintiffs at 5-6, Western Addition Community Organization v.
Weaver, Civ. No. 49,053 (N.D. Cal., filed April 9, 1968).
138 Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 42 F.R.D. 617 (D. Conn.
1967), rev'd, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968).
1-39 See Phila. Evening Bulletin, Mar. 5, 1968, at 14, col. 1.
140 See Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 42 F.R.D. 617, 620
(D. Conn. 1967), rev'd, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968).
141 See text accompanying notes 239-43 infra.
14242 U.S.C. § 1455(c) (Supp. II, 1966).
143 Typical is Harrison-Halsted Community Group, Inc. v. HHFA, 310 F.2d 99
(7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 914 (1963).
144 Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1002
(D.C. Cir. 1966).
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the courts have been so unwilling in relocation cases to discuss these
factors is not clear.145
Since there is no common law or constitutional requirement that
site residents as such be adequately relocated by the project's sponsors,'
146
relocatees' standing must rest on a statutory right to have their interests
in adequate relocation protected. Such a right may be derived from
either the Administrative Procedure Act 141 or the Housing Act. How-
ever, it is generally accepted, despite a few cases to the contrary,
48
that section 10(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act,149 which
purports to make a general grant of standing to aggrieved persons,
does not create standing where none exists independent of the Act.1'
The issue, then, is whether the Housing Act, specifically section
105(c), elevates the personal interest of the relocatee in adequate
relocation to the status of a legally protected right. Most courts have
considered section 105 (c) to be similar to other sections of the Housing
Act, in that the rights created are contractual rights, enforceable only
by the parties to the contract, (the RAA and the LPA) and conse-
quently have dismissed all suits for lack of standing. The plaintiffs
have no doubt contributed to this result through a failure to distinguish
between standing under that section (to obtain resident relocation
rights) and standing for a more ambitious attempt to block the renewal
project altogether. 5 ' The section 105(c) claim has thus usually been
buried among many other arguments advanced to achieve complete
project invalidation.
In Gart v. Cole,'52 the first court of appeals case involving the issue
of relocation, the plaintiffs used this buckshot approach. Plaintiffs there
attempted to base standing on the Administrative Procedure Act as
well as on several sections of the Housing Act, including section 105 (c).
The Second Circuit sustained on all but two counts the summary judg-
ment for lack of standing in favor of the RAA and the LPA. It
followed the accepted interpretation of section 10(a) rejecting any
standing based on the Administrative Procedure Act; it also found that
145 L. JAFFF, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACrIoN 528-29 n.97 (1965).
14 6 See text accompanying note 10 supra.
1475 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06, 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301(2) (E), 5335(a) (3) (B),
5362, 7521, App. 1002 (Supp. II, 1966).
148 The leading case espousing this minority view is American President Lines,
Ltd. v. Federal Maritime Bd., 112 F. Supp. 346 (D.D.C. 1953).
149 5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. II, 1966).
150 See Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 884 (1955); Eisenberg, Judicial Standing in Subsidy Cases:
Availability of Review Should Be Expanded, 41 A.B.A.J. 718 (1955).
151 Cf. Sullivan, Administrative Procedure and the Advocacy Process in Urban
Redevelopment, 45 CALi.. L. Ray. 134, 145-48 (1959).
152 263 F.2d 244 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 978 (1959).
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only two of the Housing Act provisions cited by the plaintiffs created
private rights protectable by the court. Both sections involved reloca-
tion. One (since repealed) prohibited the Administrator from dele-
gating the responsibility for reviewing findings by the LPAs of reloca-
tion feasibility.r, Although the plaintiffs did have standing to demand
personal review by the Administrator, inadequate proof had been
offered of his failure to review the data. The court made it clear that
had the plaintiffs offered such proof, they could have resisted the sum-
mary judgment, since the requirement that the Administrator personally
review the estimates to determine that relocation requirements are being
met "is in protection of the interests of displaced residents such as
[plaintiffs, and therefore] they have standing to raise this claim." 154
The court also held the plaintiffs had standing to request a hearing
before the Administrator on the feasibility of relocation, although it
declined on the merits to order such a hearing because there had already
been a public hearing under section 105 (d) and the RAA had given
the plaintiffs an opportunity to submit documentary information with
respect to relocation feasibility. The rationale for the finding of stand-
ing is not stated. However, in the previous paragraph in the opinion,
when considering the relocatees' allegation that the bidding arrange-
ments followed by the LPA failed to comply with the Housing Act, the
court had concluded that the sections on bidding procedures "seem de-
signed to protect not the interest of the landowners or tenants in a
development area, but those of the public at large." ' The Second
Circuit thus clearly distinguished between the rights of individuals as
relocatees and their rights as taxpaying citizens to contest the LPA's
relocation decisions.
The trial court in Gart had not made such a distinction.'58 It had
entered summary judgment in favor of the RAA and LPA on all
counts, based on the accepted interpretation of section 10(a) of the
APA as enunciated in Kansas City Light & Power Co. v. McKay.'
The district court found no alternative basis for standing in the Hous-
ing Act. It reasoned that without a positive statement of the right to
sue, or a clear statement in the legislative history that Congress intended
to give certain groups standing, none would obtain. The S'econd
Circuit's decision rejected this narrow view of the evidence required to
find authority in a statute to allow individuals standing to contest
administrative action under that statute. While agreeing with the trial
10 Act of Sept. 9, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-174, § 7(d), 79 Stat. 670, repealed the
nondelegability clause, 42 U.S.C. § 1451(c) (1964), as amended (Supp. II, 1966).
164263 F.2d at 251.
155 Id. at 250.
10 166 F. Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
167225 F2d 924 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 884 (1955).
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court's dismissal of section 10(a) as a basis for standing, it explicitly
found standing conferred by those sections of the Housing Act requir-
ing adequate relocation. The distinctions made by the Second Circuit
between standing premised on section 10(a) and on section 105(c),
and between the interests protected by section 105 (c) and those pro-
tected by other sections of the Housing Act, have been ignored in subse-
quent decisions by courts that nevertheless have purported to follow
Gart.
An example is Harrison-Halsted Community Group, Inc. v. Hous-
ing and Home Finance Agency. 5 ' The residents' primary complaint
in that case was that reuse of the land for the University of Illinois
rather than for housing for themselves was improper and should be
voided. The plaintiffs also alleged that relocation of the low-income
residents in the area was not feasible. Following Gart, the plaintiffs
should have had standing to obtain some assurance that there would be
sufficient relocation housing for site residents, although the remedy
they requested-abandonment of the project-was not necessary to
protect their interest in adequate relocation. But the court never spe-
cifically dealt with relocation in its opinion. There is no discussion of
the meaning of section 105 (c), nor of the reasons why the court found
that relocatees do not have and were not given by section 105 (c) suffi-
cient personal interest in relocation to maintain their lawsuit.
Instead, the Seventh Circuit held the plaintiffs had no standing to
sue under the Housing Act on any issue, because no specific provision
for judicial review could be found in that Act.'59 Gart v. Cole is not
cited in the court's discussion of standing under the Housing Act, even
though Gart had held standing existed under that Act. But Gart was
cited in support of the Seventh Circuit's finding of no standing under
section 10(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act. 6 ' The court's
failure to recognize that despite this holding the Gart court had found
standing based on the Housing Act may be due to the Seventh Circuit's
apparent reading of the court of appeals' decision in Gart as merely
having affirmed the district court-which, of course, was true only with
respect to the Administrative Procedure Act issue. 6'
The Harrison-Halsted opinion also cited Pittsburgh Hotels Asso-
ciation, Inc. v. Urban Redevelopment Authority 1 to support its con-
clusion that the plaintiffs had no standing under section 10(a) to main-
tain their suit. That case involved a 1959 amendment to the Housing
158 310 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 914 (1963).
159 Id. at 104.
',O Id. at 104-05.
'16 See 263 F.2d at 250-51.
162 202 F. Supp. 486 (W.D. Pa. 1962).
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Act 163 that required a survey of the necessity of new transient housing
construction before renewal sites could be used for such purposes. Re-
location was not involved; the suit was brought by existing hotels to
prevent increased competition. Its only relevance to the Harrison-
Halsted holding is that the plaintiffs in both cases attempted to enjoin
the renewal project. In Pittsburgh, the attempt was dismissed because
the amendment had been passed after the hotel had been approved for the
project site. The court recognized, however, that if the hotel owners
could demonstrate that the section was passed for their benefit they could
argue that as a result they had standing to enforce the section. 6 On
that issue, the Pittsburgh court apparently would have decided, had it
not been academic because of its holding,6 5 that the section was not
passed for the benefit of hotel owners.' 66 Their economic interest there-
fore was not protected because they could not assert that the statute was
designed to protect them from lawful competition. 6 7 The Pittsburgh
holding is a demonstration of the considerations the Seventh Circuit
should have addressed-but did not-when determining whether stand-
ing is afforded relocatees under the Housing Act's section 105 (c).
Yet Harrison-Halsted has since been read to have decided that
"plaintiffs [relocatees] have no standing to litigate questions arising
from alleged violations of the [1949 Housing Act]." 168 In Green
Street Association v. Daley,'69 the Seventh Circuit dismissed, with this
sweeping pronouncement, the count in the complaint attacking the
feasibility of relocation according to the requirements of section
105(c). Thus, without any analysis of the purpose underlying the
section, the Seventh Circuit has concluded that it is indistinguishable
from the other sections of the Housing Act in the degree of personal
interest relocatees have in its proper enforcement.
Recently, the federal district court for Connecticut was reversed
when, relying on Harrison-Halsted and the cases cited therein, it
found relocatees lacked standing to enjoin continuation of federal sup-
port for a renewal project in Norwalk. The plaintiffs were families
scheduled for relocation from the site and the Norwalk chapter of
CORE. The district court dismissed Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk
16 42 U.S.C. § 1456(g) (1964).
16 Id. at 492 n.20.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 492; see Berry v. HHFA, 340 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1965).
167 202 F. Supp. at 493. See also, e.g., Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464
(1938).
168 Green Street Ass'n v. Daley, 373 F.2d 1, 8 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S.
932 (1967).
169 Id. The petition for certiorari relied only on the question whether the Civil
Rights Act gave Negroes standing to contest a renewal plan allegedly aimed at re-
moving them from a neighborhood; the issue of adequacy of relocation was not raised
there. Petition for Certiorari.
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Redevelopment Agency 17 because it found the plaintiffs unable to
satisfy the Federal Rules' requirements for class actions. It also held
that even if this ground for dismissal was improper, the plaintiffs
nevertheless could not proceed because they lacked standing. The dis-
trict court rejected plaintiffs' arguments that Gart and the Seventh
Circuit cases were not in agreement, even though it recognized that
Gart held that the plaintiffs there were "persons suffering specific in-
juries incidental to the implementation of a renewal project [and were
proper parties to] seek redress in court." 171 But because the Norwalk
CORE plaintiffs brought suit after relocation was nearly completed and
requested an affirmative order to the LPA to construct on-site relocation
housing allegedly needed for adequate relocation, the district court felt
that somehow the relocatees were suing as landlords and tenants rather
than as relocatees. Seizing on the language in Gart that bidding pro-
cedures "seem designed to protect not the interest of the landowners
or tenants in a redevelopment area, but those of the public at large," 172
the district court suggested that CORE's requested remedy came under
the same exclusion, and hence that the plaintiffs had no standing.1 7 3
Taft Hotel Corp. v. HHFA,74 a case decided on the ground that an
economic injury to hotel owners from urban renewal activities was
not protected by the statute, was also held to be relevant to this
startling restatement of the plaintiffs' grievance.
The Second Circuit, on appeal, rejected the Seventh Circuit
cases 175 and strongly reaffirmed the finding in Gart that relocatees have
standing to protest infringement of their rights under section 105(c).
It also rejected the Ninth Circuit's decision in Johnson v. Redevelop-
ment Agency,17' another relocation case that had followed the Seventh
Circuit. Norwalk CORE should make it impossible for courts to con-
tinue to cite Gart to support a finding of lack of standing, and, because
of its forthright contradiction of other earlier holdings on relocatees'
standing, force courts to begin considering in each case presented the
issues involved in the congressional restriction on HUD authority con-
tained in section 105 (c), rather than mechanically relying on precedents.
In Johnson, for example, the court correctly saw that the issue of
relocatees' standing could be framed as whether "Congress intended
17042 F.R.D. 617 (D. Conn. 1967), rev'd, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968).
17142 F.R.D. at 623.
172 263 F.2d at 250.
1734 2 F.R.D. at 623.
174 162 F. Supp. 538 (D. Conn.), aff'd per curiam, 262 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1958),
cert. denied, 359 U.S. 967 (1959).
175 395 F.2d at 935-36.
176 317 F.2d 872 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 915 (1963). See discussion in
text accompanying note 224 infra.
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this section of the Housing Act to give a right of action to those not a
party to the contract .. 177 Nevertheless, without apparently con-
sidering the legislative history of the relocation provision, the court
adopted the Seventh Circuit's misinterpretation of Gart and its irrele-
vant citations of other urban renewal cases not involving relocation.
Although the Johnson court concluded that there was no indica-
tion of congressional intent to provide a right of action to relocatees
under section 105(c), the opposite conclusion seems more appropriate.
Section 105 (c) differs from most other sections of the Housing Act in
that, in addition to whatever function it has in serving a more general
public interest, it affords protection to a private interest group-relo-
catees. Most other sections do not even arguably protect any interest
other than the public's desire to see that tax money is not spent on
unblighted areas where private industry presumably will do the develop-
ing, that the limited land resources are wisely used, or that the city
receives the best price for the land commensurate with the intended
uses. It can be argued that the relocation section, too, protects the pub-
lic since proper enforcement will inhibit the growth of new slums
through the prevention of the overcrowding of relocatees. But this
seems a more remote reason for including section 105 (c) in the statute
than the more readily apparent purpose of protecting relocatees.
Several arguments suggest that this "private purpose" is the
dominant, if not the sole reason for the inclusion of the section in the
Act. Although section 105 (c) enumerates several minimal standards
for relocation housing, all refer to the suitability of housing as a re-
placement for the dwelling lost, while none attempts to prevent such
relocation as will foster the development of new slums. For example,
the section does not measure the new dwelling in terms of whether it is
overcrowded, but rather in terms of whether it is as convenient to work
and commercial facilities as was the former housing. When section
105(c) was passed as part of the 1949 Housing Act, the primary pur-
pose of that Act was slum clearance; urban renewal, a program in
which slum prevention would be as important as slum clearance, did
not become the primary focus of federal legislation until the 1954
amendments. 7  The goal of slum prevention was implemented by the
addition of the requirement for the Workable Program for Community
Improvement. It is the Workable Program, not section 105(c), that
requires the LPAs to plan their programs "to eliminate, and prevent
the development or spread of, slums .... 17 Section 105 (c) was not
altered to reflect the new citywide slum prevention approach, as it might
.77 317 F.2d at 874 (emphasis added).
178 See text accompanying notes 21-23 supra.
17942 U.S.C. § 1451(c) (Supp. II, 1966).
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have been by barring relocation into overcrowded facilities.'8 ° The
section thus retained its primary purpose of assisting relocatees in over-
coming the problems raised by massive destruction of low-cost housing
units.
The Senate report on the Housing Act unequivocally stated that
clearance could not begin unless adequate permanent housing was or
was being made available for relocatees, as well as temporary housing
if necessary.' A former Housing and Home Finance Agency official,
in an article based on research materials provided by HHFA, remarked
that the Housing Act might not have been passed without the pro-
tection for relocatees embodied in section 105 (c).'s In 1965 Congress
strengthened the command to the RAA and the LPAs to protect
relocatees with the addition of subsection (2) to section 105(c):
LPAs are now required to bring their estimates of relocation resource
availability up to date within a reasonable time prior to actual displace-
ment and relocation.'3 And in 1966, the Widnall amendment partially
restricted the wide latitude given the RAA to approve project reuse 1
by requiring new projects that are primarily residential to contain
a "substantial number of units" of low or moderate income housing."
The RAA was further restricted in 1968, when "substantial number"
was replaced by "majority." 186 In the past ten years Congress has
adopted a number of relocation requirements for government land
acquisition programs other than urban renewal. 8 Many of these new
provisions were specifically placed beyond judicial review,88 yet section
105(c), amended twice during this period, has had no such limitation
added to it. Section 105 (c), therefore, is and has been viewed pri-
marily as a means of protecting and benefiting relocatees.
Even if section 105 (c) is not viewed as having created "private"
rights in relocatees, they could be found to have standing to seek review
180 Both the GAO and the Urban Renewal Administration, while disagreeing on
the amount of coordination Congress intended between § 101 (c) (Workable Program)
and § 105(c) (relocation), did agree that the Workable Program requirement was
added to strengthen the effectiveness of relocation by aiming at more long-range
problems. GAO FORT WORTH WORKABLE PROGRAM REPORT, upra note 80, at 39-45.
181 See text accompanying note 18 supra.
182 Millspaugh, supra note 12, at 11, says: "Had the safeguards for displaced
families not been included in § 105(c) of the Housing Act of 1949, there is some doubt
that the Act could have mustered enough votes for passage."
18842 U.S.C. § 1455(c) (2) (Supp. II, 1966). See text following note 103 supra,
and discussion of 1968 Housing Act amendments in text accompanying note 250-53
infra.
184 See discussion in text accompanying note 63 supra.
185 Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, Pub. L. No.
89-754, § 703(a), 80 Stat. 1281 [may be found in 42 U.S.C. § 1455(f) (Supp. II, 1966)].
186 Housing aid Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 512, 82
Stat. 524; see text accompanying notes 63-65 supra.
187 See note 11 supra.
188 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2473(b) (14) (1964) (NASA) ; 43 U.S.C. § 1232 (1964)
(Dep't of Interior).
[Vol.l17:183
ENFORCEMENT OF CONDITIONS
as representatives of the public's interest in enforcement of the section.
It is clear that relocatees as a group will be more likely than members
of the public at large to seek enforcement of the public's interest in
adequate relocation. The principle, that citizens need not suffer a per-
sonal economic injury before seeking review of the alleged failure of
an administrator to protect the public interest has been reaffirmed in
two recent decisions in the Second and District of Columbia Circuit
Courts of Appeals. In Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v.
Federal Power Commission,"9 the Second Circuit was confronted with
a challenge to the standing of an association of conservation groups
which had brought an action to enjoin an FPC decision to license the
construction of a power plant. Observing that the Federal Power Act,
under which the decision to license was made, mandated the FPC to
consider recreation and conservation implications when making its de-
cisions, and that the plaintiff association was composed of groups "who
by their activities and conduct have exhibited a special interest in such
area," the court held the association had standing under the Act to
challenge the Commission's decision if it alleged that the decision was
injurious to recreation and conservation. 9 '
Similarly, the District of Columbia Circuit held, in Office of Com-
munication of United Church of Christ v. FCC,'9' that listeners of the
only TV station in the area had standing to object to the renewal of a
TV license by the FCC, and could intervene in the FCC hearings on
the renewal, if any were held. The FCC argued that since it was
mandated to protect the consumer, consumer participation was not
necessary for enforcement of the statute. The court observed-that,
even in the case where there are multiple competing stations in an area,
"unless the listeners-the broadcast consumers--can be heard, there
may be no one to bring programming deficiencies or offensive over-
commercialization to the attention of the Commission in an effective
manner." 12 Similarly, relocatees "willing to shoulder the burdensome
and costly processes of intervention ... are likely to be the only ones
'having a sufficient interest' "'3 to challenge the RAA's approval of a
decision that relocation resources are adequate. Commenting on the
relevance of these cases to its consideration of the Norwalk CORE
case, the Second Circuit concluded that "the possibility that an adminis-
trative agency, charged with enforcing a requirement established by
Congress in the public interest, will not adequately perform the task
189 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
190 354 F.2d at 616.
191 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
1921d. at 1004-05.
193Id. at 1005. See generally L. JAFxF, JUDICIAL CoNmOL OF ADMINISTRATIVE
AcTrON 459-501 (1965).
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is equally great whether enforcement is through contract or through
direct regulation." 14
A federal district court in Philadelphia used the above analysis in
a recently contested relocation case. The court enjoined continuation
of a renewal project not yet beyond the condemnation stage pending
an opportunity for plaintiff homeowners' association to demonstrate
to the RAA the inadequacy of relocation resources for the project. In
Powelton Civic Home Owners Association v. Department of Housing
and Urban Development,"9 5 the court found that section 105 (c) creates
"substantive legal rights" in the relocatees. 96 The decision specifically
followed Gart, and the court recognized the distinctions between that
case and subsequent decisions misconstruing its holding.'W The court
also held that plaintiffs had standing as representatives of the public in-
terest (citing Scenic Hudson, Church of Christ, and a recent district
court decision in New York City ' holding that property owners have
standing to question highway routes under the Federal Highway
Act)." The Highway Act, like the Housing Act, contains no specific
authorization for judicial review.200 The district court in Powelton
noted that both it and the court in Gart had only to consider whether
relocatees have standing to seek procedural relief; neither had to decide
the case on the merits. Thus, while recognizing the standing of re-
locatees to seek judicial relief, neither court was involved in an exam-
ination of the substantive rights of relocatee plaintiffs.2 '
b. Reviewing Planning Decisions
If the RAA rejects the views of relocatees, who then return to
court for a decision on the substantive issue whether the evidence
demonstrates an inadequacy of relocation resources amounting to a
violation of the contractual promise required by section 105 (c), stand-
ing to seek substantive review should follow for the same reasons as
justify standing for procedural review. The primary issue then will
not be standing, but rather how to evaluate the administrative finding
that adequate relocation resources are available.
It has been suggested that one explanation for the confusing hold-
ings in the relocation cases might be the unwillingness of the courts to
194 395 F.2d at 934.
195 284 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
196 Id. at 821.
'
9 7 Id. at 823.
198 Road Review League v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
199 284 F. Supp. at 825.
200See id. at 828.
201 Id. at 828 n.10.
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move into this area of supposed administrative expertise.2" As the
court in Powelton observed, "Judicial reluctance to intervene in the
planning policy decisions of the Secretary [of HUD] is an under-
standable and recognized phenomenon . . . . " " Several cases have
demonstrated this reluctance. The Johnson court observed that be-
cause of the complexity of the urban renewal title of the Housing Act,
Congress gave the RAA the duty of "enforcing" the contract condi-
tions, including the required relocation provision of the LPA con-
tract.2 The district court in Norwalk CORE construed the plaintiffs'
request for adequate relocation housing to be a request for recognition
of a right to plan the project, which it termed a request for "drastic
judicial intervention into a large, almost fully completed urban re-
newal project." 205 Both statements reject any possibility that courts,
using the normal techniques for review of administrative decisions,
might be able to determine that at some point the Administrator has
exceeded the bounds of his discretion. This rejection is not realistic;
a court can always review the Administrator's decisions in light of the
standards he himself has published to govern his review of LPA de-
cisions. And given the elements of adequate relocation named in sec-
tion 105(c), it can determine whether all are being considered and
whether the techniques used to evaluate them are valid for that purpose.
In most cases, the administrator's decision will have to be based
on the LPA's statistical predictions of economic growth, migration to
and from the city, changing housing supply, and so forth, unless the
community is so small that housing resources can be actually counted
(as in Pulaski, Tennessee). It will probably be three or more years
after the decision before clearance and relocation commence and the
actual housing conditions under which relocation must occur will be
known. Nevertheless, a proper use of statistics can cut down the mar-
gin of error involved when predicting housing available in the future.
The RAA, however, has not always demanded that the LPA use statis-
tics properly, nor has it always properly evaluated the statistics sub-
mitted by the LPAs. In some cases the same housing has been claimed
to be available for several simultaneous projects, 0 6 competing demands
for housing have not been considered, 20 7 or future availability has been
extrapolated from past turnover rates without compensating for for-
m See L. JAF7E, JUDIcIAL CONTROL OF ADm.NISTRATIVE AcTIoN 529 n.97
(1965).
203 284 F. Supp. at 824.
204 Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency, 317 F.2d 872, 874 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 915 (1963).
205 Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Authority, 42 F. R. D. 617, 623
(D. Conn. 1967), rev'd, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968).
206 See GAO FORT WORTH WORKABLE PRoGRAm REPORT, supra note 80, at 63.
207 See note 133 supra.
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merly available housing destroyed by the project.2"8 Moreover, the avail-
able data depend to a large extent on information submitted by LPAs
whose commitment to help relocatees is doubtful when such a concern
might result in a project less economically successful for the com-
munity.
20 9
At the very least, therefore, a court ought to permit inquiry into
whether the techniques were properly used. In addition, the feasibility
finding must be based on statistical data-the housing census, site oc-
cupancy surveys and other information the LPA is required to submit.
Examination of the methodology used in obtaining the data, as well as
the validity of the conclusion reached with the statistics available,
should not be foreclosed. Whether statistics are being misused or
whether they are adequate to do the job demanded of them by the RAA
and LPA are issues on which private city planners with training in the
analysis of housing statistics can certainly speak with as much authority
as planners working for the RAA or the LPA. In addition to the use
of expert opinion, evidence might be adduced concerning the accuracy
of the statistics by introducing the documents that the RAA claims are
used-but not always are 21 -to verify the LPA's application. These
would include the Workable Program submissions, statements on com-
munity housing conditions by the local public housing authority, other
renewal applications submitted by the city, and so forth.' Another
check on the feasibility finding would be to compare the situation de-
picted in the statistics presented by the LPA with the standards it has
adopted as part of the renewal plan.2 2 Subjecting these matters to
judicial scrutiny should have the beneficial effect of preventing those
relocation problems that have arisen in part, at least, because of misuse
of statistical data.
Finally, the standards themselves can be reviewed to see if they
conform to the RAA guidelines published in Technical Guide No. 9.213
While the standards there established are phrased in terms of "should"
rather than "must" (probably in part due to deference to the concept
of the LPA's local autonomy), good reason for deviation should be
required if they are not adhered to in particular cases. Otherwise the
administrator's decision approving them would appear to be arbitrary
and capricious, and susceptible to reversal on the grounds that he must
treat all beneficiaries-both LPAs and relocatees-alike, unless he has
208 Interview with Walter Thabit, ATP, President, Planners for Equal Oppor-
tunity, in New York City, April 27, 1967.
Mo9 See text accompanying note 110 supra.
210 See text accompanying notes 113-20 supra.
211 Geffner Interview, supra note 98.
2 12 See TEcH. GUIDE No. 9, supra note 87.
213 See text accompanying notes 89-93 supra.
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a good reason for doing otherwise. 14 Moreover, the RAA and the
LPA rather than the relocatees should have the burden of proving that
"there are, or are being provided" to those displaced, units sufficient to
rehouse them according to the standards set forth in section 105 (c).215
Both the positive phraseology of the section and the congressional com-
ments concerning the original legislation dictate this conclusion. The
burden should include presentation of sufficient data on which a rea-
sonable estimation of the future housing supply can be based, as well as
a showing that the minimal standards of the RAA's Technical Guide
No. 9 have been met.
The court might, should it be unable or unwilling to reverse the
RAA's decision that adequate relocation is feasible, retain jurisdiction
until actual relocation has been completed, ensuring that "there are, or
are being provided" sufficient dwellings satisfying section 105 (c) cri-
teria. Alternatively, the plaintiffs might renew their attack after relo-
cation begins, if it turns out that relocation is unsatisfactory. Cer-
tainly if the first actual relocations cannot be completed properly, later
ones will not be.
c. Timing of the Suit
In two instances 2 6 relocatees have sought to enjoin the continua-
tion of projects already underway until relocation practices improved.
In Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency,217 the court pointed out that dis-
missal because of lack of standing did not really deprive the plaintiffs
of any means of redress since they could have challenged the plan at
preliminary hearings required by the state and federal statutes.21 The
court reasoned that, in the absence of public objection, the LPA had
a right to proceed with the project on the assumption that its plans
were acceptable.
This is not always a valid argument. If the project's implementa-
tion has been delayed for several years after initial planning there is a
good chance that the city's population patterns will have changed. If
the actual growth patterns, housing construction starts, or other pro-
jections by the housing analyst have not materialized, then what were
once perfectly acceptable relocation plans may have become quite un-
214 See, e.g., Merge v. Sharott, 341 F.2d 989 (3d Cir. 1965) (relocation payments).
See also Reich, The Law of the Planned Society, 75 YALE L.J. 1227, 1245-46 (1966).
21542 U.S.C. § 1455(c) (Supp. II, 1966) (emphasis added).
216 Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency, 317 F.2d 872 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 915 (1963); Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920
(2d Cir. 1968).
217317 F.2d 872 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 915 (1963).
218 317 F.2d at 875. This was cited in Powelton Civic Home Owners Ass'n v.
HUD, 284 F. Supp. 809, 824-25 (E.D. Pa. 1968), as a basis for distinguishing Johnso;
from Powelton.
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acceptable. Section 105 (c) (2) recognizes this by requiring the LPA,
within a reasonable time prior to commencement of actual relocation,
to update the data used to support its feasibility finding."" The pres-
ence or absence of the plaintiff relocatees at the requisite public hearing
should only be considered if the context of actual relocation does not
differ from that forseen in the plan presented at the public hearing.
Norwalk CORE also was first brought after the project had
begun-in fact, when the last tract was being cleared. The plaintiffs
claimed to have evidence of many improper relocations from earlier
stages of the project, which was admitted for purposes of the decision. 20
No suit had been filed before the project began because at the time the
relocation plan had been prepared and filed in the late 1950's it was not
realized that the LPA's estimate of public housing turnover, the pri-
mary relocation resource, was unrealistic. The district court made no
mention of the plaintiffs' failure to protest earlier as an objection to the
suit. Instead, the suit was dismissed because the plaintiffs could not
properly denominate themselves a class within the new Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court concluded that the plain-
tiffs' remedy for the admitted improprieties was a series of individual
legal actions.2 ' The Second Circuit summarily reversed the finding
on the satisfaction of Rule 23,' and also found standing to assert both
the claim of a denial of equal protection and of the violation of section
105 (c). 3
2. Against the Local Public Authority
a. Third Party Beneficiary
In the absence of satisfactory enforcement by the RAA of the
contract clause requiring the LPA to ensure that there is an adequate
supply of relocation housing before commencing a project, some re-
locatees have attempted to enforce that clause directly against the LPA
under a third party beneficiary contract theory. This analysis also de-
pends on the finding that the primary, if not the sole, reason for the
inclusion of the requirement that such a clause be in the RAA-LPA
contract is to protect relocatees, and that such is the intent of the
promissee (RAA). It is argued that relocatees become third party
beneficiaries, and hence entitled in many jurisdictions to enforce the
contract clause even though the promisee fails to do so.
219 See discussion in text following note 103 supra.
220 Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 42 F.R.D. 617, 619 (D.
Conn. 1967), rev'd, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968).
21 42 F.R.D. at 621.
222 395 F.2d at 937.
22= See discussion in text accompanying notes 170-75 mipra.
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The theory was rejected when presented to the Ninth Circuit in
JohnsonYa  Standing was predicated in the action against the LPA
on the contractual obligation of the LPA to the RAA, which resulted,
it was claimed, in a duty under California law to the third party
beneficiaries. Holding that federal rather than California law applied
since the dispute arose under a federal staute, the court concluded
that federal courts had consistently held that those not a party to the
contract had no standing to enforce conditions of the contract.
The central issue in a third party beneficiary case, the inten-
tion of the parties when including the protective clause, was never pur-
sued by the court. Although this is the same question that was pre-
sented in the earlier federal cases on standing, none of those cases had
considered the question except Gart, where the conclusion was not that
stated by the Johnson court. Even when squarely presented with the
issue of the function of section 105 (c) in the Housing Act, Johnson
elected to rely on decisions that contained no evidence of having con-
sidered the issue. None of the prior cases had distinguished between
theories supporting an action against the RAA as opposed to one against
the LPA, yet Johnson, because the RAA was not joined, presented an
opportunity to think this issue through as well. In yet another case,
Hunter v. City of New York,225 relocatees were told, without much
further explanation, that the leading New York case establishing the
right of a third party beneficiary to sue on a contract 226 was "without
application to the case at bar." 227 The issue of intent, again, was not
discussed in the case.
b. State Relocation Laws
Nearly every state has legislation (often containing a relocation
provision modeled after section 105 (c)) authorizing municipalities to
undertake urban renewal projects. 22 8 However, section 105 (c) is part
of a system in which an administrative agency performs a significant
first line review function by reviewing all applications for assistance
and preparing guidelines and standards to implement the legislation.
Few states (if any) have established a comparable agency, and state
courts therefore are forced to develop guidelines via case decisions.
Yet unlike an administrative agency, a court does not review all LPA
224Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency, 317 F.2d 872 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 915 (1963).
=5 121 N.Y.S.2d 841 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
2 2 6 Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268 (1859).
227 121 N.Y.S.2d at 846.
228See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SArm-Y CoDE §§33367(d)(7)-(8) (West 1967);
N.Y. GEN. MuN. LA-w. § 505(4) (e) (McKinney 1965).
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decisions. It does not have an agency's staff nor does it acquire an
expertise in reviewing renewal and relocation plans. It is nearly im-
possible for a court to determine whether or not there has been compli-
ance with general restrictions on LPA conduct, such as those imposed
by section 105(c). For this reason, some state courts, faced with
challenges to LPA relocation decisions, have concluded that since an
LPA is receiving federal money, its relocation planning must be satis-
fying the requirements of section 105 (c), and hence, those of the state
statute as well.229 While not completely unsound, this reasoning makes
it impossible for relocatees to win a state court case because the demon-
stration of unfeasibility is precluded by decisions of RAA administra-
tors, who are not parties to the action and whose bases for decision
cannot be known.
23 0
For example, in New York's Hunter case another reason given
for not considering whether the RAA had properly enforced section
105 (c) was that the agency already had found relocation feasible.
This constituted some evidence, the court concluded, that the LPA had
not erred in its estimation of feasibility.21 Other state courts have
similarly found RAA approval highly persuasive of the propriety of
that approval. In Housing and Redevelopment Authority v. Minneap-
olis Metropolitan Co.,2 3 2 evidence was presented that a large percentage
of the relocatees would be without housing unless 1250 new units of
low income housing were constructed somewhere in the city. The LPA
was neither planning nor building the needed units, and no evidence was
presented that private industry was supplying them. In fact, the court
found that "no express provision was made in the [renewal] plan for
[the tenants'] relocation." 233 Nevertheless, because the city council
had passed the federally required resolution that relocation was feasible,
and since
the Federal Housing Administration [had] already advanced
to the Minneapolis Authority loans and grants in excess of
10 million dollars, [it is assumed] that the standards of
compliance established under Federal procedures have been
met. 3
229 See, e.g., Housing & Redevelopment Auth. v. Minneapolis Metropolitan Co.,
259 Minn. 1, 104 N.W.2d 864 (1960), discussed in text accompanying notes 232-34
infra.
230 In Hunter v. City of New York, 121 N.Y.S.2d 841 (Sup. Ct. 1953), the state
court held that the plaintiffs had chosen the wrong forum, even had they been able to
maintain their third party beneficiary suit, since it was brought in the state court:
"state courts have no jurisdiction over the acts of federal officials acting as such in the
administration of the federal laws or as agencies of the federal government." Id. at
847-48.
23 Id. at 848.
232 259 Minn. 1, 104 N.W.2d 864 (1960).
2 33 Id. at 11, 104 N.W.2d at 872.
2
3
4 Id. at 13, 104 N.W.2d at 873.
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At least one state case has also specifically followed the Seventh
Circuit's rule that relocatees have no legal standing to complain of relo-
cation, but again without giving any reasons for its conclusion. In
City of Chicago v. R. Zwick Co.,2 35 a condemnation action, site residents
asserted that not all the provisions of the Housing Act had been com-
plied with by the LPA. The Illinois Supreme Court did not make clear
whether the provisions in question included section 105 (c), since the
statutory reference in the opinion comprises the entire Act. Perhaps
the lack of explicitness made it easier for the court to follow the
Harrison-Halsted decision, which the Illinois court interpreted as a
dismissal of a similar suit both for "want of a substantial Federal
question," 236 and for failure by plaintiffs to distinguish their interests
from those of taxpayers in general. "That view seems eminently cor-
rect, and it is adopted as the view of this court. Furthermore the ques-
tion sought to be raised is not a proper issue in a condemnation ac-
tion." 37  Thus, without any judicial consideration of the issue,
relocatees in Illinois can use neither state nor federal courts to protect
their interests and must rely solely on the LPA and the RAA to do so.
3. Remedies
In theory, LPAs are local agencies independent of the RAA. Any
remedy sought against an LPA will have to relate to its status as a
non-federal public agency. For example, the Housing Act does not
require the LPA to provide adequate relocation facilities. The federal
law applies only to the federal agency, the RAA, and merely prohibits
that agency from making grants to, or contracts with, LPAs that will
not abide by the standards set in the statute.
While a relocatee should be given standing to question relocation
activities as a beneficiary of section 105 (c) of the Housing Act, the
only LPA-relocatee relationship created by the Act is the third party
beneficiary relationship. Perhaps because relocatees have not been con-
tent simply to secure adequate housing, and have brought suit to void
the entire renewal project, only two cases, Johnson and Hunter, have
even considered this theoretical basis for relief. As has been pointed
out, neither court provided any satisfactory reason for not finding
liability under this analysis.
Since the Housing Act imposes no obligations on the LPA, only
state or local law could impose a duty on the LPA to protect relocatees.
Yet the state courts that have considered their urban renewal or con-
demnation statutes have found that they do not establish a relationship
=5 27 Ill. 2d 128, 188 N.E.2d 489, appeal dismissed, 373 U.S. 542 (1963).
236 Id. at 133, 188 N.E.2d at 492.
237 Id.
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between the LPA and the relocatee that would entitle the relocatee to
judicial relief."' The remedy suggested by several courts," 9 that relo-
catees can best secure their rights in individual legal actions against the
LPA is, if only for this reason, unrealistic. In addition, individual
actions would be prohibitively expensive for people who, by definition,
have very limited economic resources. The individual action could
only be brought at the time of condemnation since, as an individual, the
relocatee would be injured only when he personally is offered inade-
quate housing. But the relocatee who waits for eviction proceedings
will be one of the last residents on the site, which by then will probably
be a large and deserted area in the middle or on the border of a slum.
Municipal services such as garbage collection and police and fire pro-
tection will be reduced, if only because fewer residents live nearby.
The pressure to move quickly once the majority of residents have left
can force a relocatee to accept less than the standard apartment he is
guaranteed under federal and state law, rather than resist eviction until
the legal requirements are satisfied. An RAA official in 1965 observed
that, up to that time, there had been no legal contests over the accept-
ability of housing offered by the LPA, probably because a holdout can-
not wait for a court fight when surrounded by bulldozers instead of
neighbors.24 A social worker writing of her experience in Washington,
D.C., remarked that "those who were not the first to go... were fur-
ther depressed by living in crumbling and deserted neighborhoods." 241
Moreover, the more articulate and aggressive site residents, those who
might be able to withstand these pressures and seek a remedy in indi-
vidual condemnation actions are the least likely to need judicial relief
to secure proper relocation assistance.242  Large or fatherless families,
the elderly, and the poor are more difficult to relocate, and the LPA is
more likely to take advantage of them.243
2 38 See text accompanying notes 229-37 supra.
239 See, e.g., Harrison-Halsted Community Group v. HHFA, 310 F2d 99, 106
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 914 (1962).
240 Franklin, Expanding Relocation Responsibilities of Local Renewal Agencies,
11 N.Y.L.F. 51, 74 (1965).
241 Quoted in ScHoRR, supra note 5, at 69.
2 42 See D. THuRtsz, WHERE ARE THEY Now? 3 (1966) (a study of relocation
results five years after relocation from the Southwest Urban Renewal Project in
Washington, D.C.); L. WATTS, H. FREEMAN, H. HUGHEs, R. Monais, & T. PEri-
GREW, THE MMDLE-INCOME NEGRO FAmILY FACES URBAN RENEwAL 55 (1964). Both
books describe how the middle-income residents looked forward to the renewal project
because they expected to stay and reap the advantages of the improved neighborhood,
schools, municipal services, etc.-an alternative the poor family cannot take advantage
of in most instances because of the few low-income units built on renewal sites.
243 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1967, at 20, col. 1, where it was reported that
the village of North Tarrytown had "relocated" one of its urban renewal project site
residents, a woman with five children and two grandchildren, into a house scheduled
for renewal demolition in the adjoining community. The charges and countercharges
included an implication that even the Urban Renewal Administration knew of the
"relocation," but acquiesced because of the problem posed by the size of the family.
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The inability of site residents to obtain adequate rehousing is most
probably due to the failure of the LPA to ensure that there were
adequate facilities in the first place. A series of individual court actions
will not solve the underlying problem of a shortage of necessary low
cost housing, since it takes some time to plan and construct such hous-
ing. If courts are unwilling to consider, let alone order, corrective
action by the LPA as a result of a suit brought at the planning stage
of the renewal project, when relief would be effective yet not disrupt
the project, it is doubtful that a court would delay a project already under-
way on the showing by one individual that the accommodations available
to him are below standards set by the Act.2 " In short, even if the
relocatees were to bring individual actions for injunctive relief, or were
to defend eviction orders because relocation was not possible, it does
not seem likely that they would receive more help than the courts have
been willing to give them in their class actions.
Accordingly, the most appropriate source of relief is the RAA.
Section 105(c) limits the eligible agencies with which the RAA has
the authority to make grants and contracts-that is, the RAA may only
negotiate with those local agencies that agree to comply with the statu-
tory requirements. A court, therefore, can enjoin the RAA from
continuing to provide funds to a project not complying with the con-
tractual promise concerning relocation feasibility. 45 Whether relo-
catees have standing as representatives of the public interest or as
private parties seeking to enforce a private right created by statute,
they should be heard when the issue is whether the RAA is complying
with the section 105 (c) limitations. The remedy provided the plaintiffs
for the RAA's failure to abide by the limitation on its authority is
judicial enforcement, through an injunction, of the limitation on that
authority.
Aside from procedural objections that have usually been decided
in favor of the relocatees 246 the primary objection to preventing the
RAA from continuing to fund a project is the excessive cost that will
be incurred by even a temporary cessation of project activity.2 4 It
takes some time for an LPA to plan and construct needed low-cost
housing, and presumably this is the only way it could correct a shortage
of relocation housing. But a new RAA regulation suggests a means
2 4 4 Cf. TEcH. GUIme No. 9, supra note 87.
2 4 5 Cf. Road Review League v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
246 See, e.g., Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920
(2d Cir. 1968) (class action requirements) ; Gart v. Cole, 263 F.2d 244, 249-50 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 978 (1959); Powelton Civic Home Owner's Ass'n v.
HUD, 284 F. Supp. 809, 832-35 (E. D. Pa. 1968) (service of process and sovereign
immunity).
2 4 7 See Phila. Evening Bulletin, March 5, 1968, at 14, col. 1.
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for reducing the delay period to a matter of weeks, thereby eliminating
any claim of administrative inconvenience.24 LPA Letter No. 453
"Use of Mobil Homes as Temporary Relocation Resources," 249 permits
LPAs to charge to the renewal project the costs of setting up a mobile
home facility to be used for temporary relocation. The RAA requires,
as a minimum, that the trailers have connected utilities and the other
amenities required of relocation housing (location convenient to schools,
transportation, etc.), and that permanent relocation resources be
planned or underway.
The decision with respect to the form permanent housing should
take should be left to the LPA, consistent with its responsibility for plan-
ning the city's redevelopment. Construction of more low-cost housing
will probably be the only real remedy, unless relocation resources have
been inadequate merely because of LPA indifference to its responsi-
bility to locate existing relocation housing. A court should not avoid
ordering the RAA to cease supporting the project until the LPA de-
vises a means of complying with the condition it accepted in return for
financial support of its project, even if such a decision would require
the construction of more low cost housing. The alternative is abdica-
tion by the court of its responsibility for ensuring that statutory limita-
tions on legislative delegation are enforced.
C. The 1968 Housing Act Amendments
A major change in funding procedure authorized by the 1968
Housing Act 2o should result in greater RAA capability for controlling
actions of the LPAs during the course of urban renewal. Instead of
funding separate projects, the Neighborhood Development Program 25
puts an LPA on an annual funding cycle rather than a project funding
cycle. Funds will be made available at one time during the year for all
projects then underway, and net project cost (a percentage of which is
paid by the RAA) is recomputed each year to see whether the LPA
owes money to the RAA because receipts from sales exceeded cost dur-
ing the year,252 or whether the RAA owes money to the LPA. The
major defect of the new legislation, one which may render the new
program completely ineffective, is that the new funding procedure need
not be used by LPAs if they prefer the older project-by-project funding
technique.
248 This factor evidently weighed heavily with the lower court in Norwalk CORE
v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 42 F.R.D. 617, 621-22 (D. Conn. 1967), rev'd, 395
F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968).
249 April 5, 1968.
2ZO Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 476.
2z1 Id. §§ 501-16, 82 Stat. 518-20 (title V).
2 52 Id. § 501, 82 Stat. 519, adding a new § 132(b) to the Housing Act of 1949.
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This revised method of financing will affect the RAA's ability to
evaluate the adequacy of relocation resources because section 134(a)
(3)"" provides that section 105(c) applies to each annual increment
provided the LPA. This may be interpreted to mean that each year
the LPA must demonstrate to the RAA, as a condition for receipt of
its increment for the next twelve months, that housing is available for
relocatees to be displaced during the coming year. The RAA will be
better able to determine whether adequate housing is available than with
its present three-year-plus housing projections, and current data will be
available for judicial review of the RAA finding of an adequacy of re-
location resources.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE NEED FOR INDEPENDENT REVIEW
When the interests of those carrying out renewal conflict with the
interests of those affected by renewal there must be a forum, inde-
pendent of the RAA which allies itself with the concerns of the LPAs,
where relocatees can secure the protection of their interests established
in section 105 (c). Cotuts have traditionally provided this forum.
They have not hesitated to interfere with the programs of other govern-
ment agencies when a sufficient showing has been made that the agency
is ignoring those limitations on its powers designed to protect certain
interests.
25
From the LPA's point of view, the best time for review is upon
approval by the RAA. A suit at that time would settle the section
105(c) question (except in an unusual case, as Norwalk CORE)2 55
at an early stage, and the project would not be hampered by threats of a
suspension of funds after it had begun. This is perhaps the rationale
behind a California statute requiring that interested parties objecting
to the renewal plan must bring an action within sixty days of approval
of the plan by the city government."" The difficulties involved in pro-
viding effective protection at a later time make it incumbent on courts to
hear relocatee complaints made at the time of project approval. To
follow the Seventh Circuit's refusal to review relocation feasibility will
often result in a denial of the benefits of section 105(c) to the relo-
catees. This is especially so, when, as in Illinois, the state courts have
held that a challenge based on section 105 (c) is improperly raised in a
2 53Id., 82 Stat. 520.
24See Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966) ; Reich, supra note 214, at 1248-51.
255 Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 42 F.R.D. 617 (D.
Conn. 1967), rev'd, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968).
2-56 CAL. HEALTH & SArrY CODE § 33500 (West 1967).
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condemnation action.2 57 However, since the finding must be based on
statistical prediction, a sufficient opportunity for error exists even when
the data is adequate and the interpretation proper. In such cases, the
courts must be prepared to review the evidence of current relocation
experience as bearing on the issue of compliance with section 105 (c).
It will be argued by the opponents of review of RAA determina-
tions that court tests will delay the renewal program to the point where
planning can no longer be effective. Judicial review should not result
in such drastic consequences, however. Not every renewal plan will be
taken to court, partly because of the cost,25 partly because the avail-
ability of the judicial remedy should itself reduce improper administra-
tive determinations. Moreover, enforcement of the requirement of
proper relocation preparation and execution will actually further the
purposes of urban renewal. 9  The slum problem is not solved by
moving people from one ghetto to another, especially when, as studies
have shown, the net result is an increase in rent 260 and a necessarily
reduced percentage of income available for food, clothing, and medi-
cine. The core problem is a shortage of low income housing units.
Any pressure generated through legal action to increase the number
of such units constructed, whether on the site or off, can only further
the purposes of urban renewal in preventing the spread of slums as
well as providing "a decent home and a suitable living environment
for every American family." 261 The shortsighted policy of the LPAs
257 City of Chicago v. R. Zwick Co., 27 Ill.2d 128, 188 N.E.2d 489, appeal dis-
missed, 373 U.S. 542 (1963), discussed in text accompanying notes 235-37 upra.
258 Walter Thabit estimated that it would cost from $10,000 to $20,000 to develop
the data necessary to show a particular relocation plan was not feasible in a com-
munity, and to present this in a court case, "assuming the lawyer will ask only a
modest fee." Thabit Interview, supra note 208; cf. the response of the Supreme Court
to the congestion argument in Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 310 (1944).
259 Thus the Subcommittee on Housing of the House Committee on Banking &
Currency urged in 1966 that
the Federal authorities charged with overseeing relocation responsibilities
exercise increased vigilance to make sure that the municipalities are in fact
doing an effective and humane job in this area. Every effort should be made
to insure a workable relocation plan with adequate personnel to supervise the
working out of the program. If displaced families are merely shunted to
another slum area or an area which is on the verge of becoming a slum, the
problem is only aggravated further.
Report No. 1 to House Comm. on Banking & Currency, Jan. 31, 1956, quoted at length
in GAO WASHINGTON, D.C. REPoRT, upra note 86, at 5.
26) Secretary Weaver has said that, of 789 relocated families observed in one
study, the rent paid before renewal was at a median level of $54.00 per month, that
after relocation the median had risen to $65.00 per month; 19% of the families' rent-
income ratio decreased after relocation, 10% experienced no change, 53% an increase
of up to 9%, and 19% an increase of over 10%. Hearings Before the Subconmn. on
Housing of the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 41
(1964). The relocation adjustment payment program, see text accompanying notes
40-48 supra, and the rent supplement program for which relocatees are eligible, 12
U.S.C. § 1701 (s) (Supp. II, 1966), implicitly recognize the problem.
26142 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964).
ENFORCEMENT OF CONDITIONS
and the RAA in the past has resulted in the creation of greater slums
and greater problems. If there are 1250 too few units in Minneapolis
to accommodate relocatees,262 or 63,000 in St. Louis,2" the people have
to go someplace; inevitably, they will overcrowd other houses, which
will then deteriorate more rapidly, or move to other cities, although
of all the members of the general public they have the least resources
with which to move.
As it has been implemented, the Housing Act has not always con-
tributed to the well-being of the population of the whole city. Upper-
and middle-income groups have been able to take advantage of the
subsidy involved in urban renewal to displace the poor, who in turn
receive no subsidy for their housing. Yet the public as a whole pays the
acquisition cost of the renewal site when it is subsequently resold to
private developers at a price substantially lower than that which the
city paid.2"' It is perfectly reasonable for the public to impose limita-
tions on the use of the subsidy so that those who are able to take advan-
tage of it do not, in so doing, injure the interests of others. When
Congress has limited the granting of a subsidy, as it did when it passed
section 105(c), the limitation should be respected by the responsible
administrative agency and, if necessary, enforced by the court.
262 See case discussed in text accompanying notes 232-34 supra.
263 See GAO FORT WORTH WORKABLE PRoGRAm REPORT, supra note 80, at 66-67.
2M4 Grigsby, Housing and Slum Clearance: Elusive Goals, 352 ANNALS 107, 112
(1964). Gans, The Human Implications of Current Redevelopment and Relocation
Planning, 25 J. Am. INsT. PLANNERS 15, 23 n.39 (1959), and Hartman, supra note 85,
at 278, both compare the American redevelopment approach of benefiting the developer
and his high-rise, high-income tenants, with the British goal of ensuring rehousing for
all classes within the community.
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